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SUMMARY
This dissertation leverages the capabilities of software-defined networking (SDN) and
network functions virtualization (NFV) to enhance network security and management. By
first exploring SDN-based security solutions and then systematically building an SDN-
based programming framework and a security policy transition framework, this research
makes possible a security/management system for SDNs that is also capable of reducing
network operator workloads. With this work’s programming framework, Ryuretic, network
operators are offered more intuitive abstractions for creating their own network applications
using fewer lines of code. Additionally, network operator configuration requirements are
reduced by the incorporation of an automated security policy transition framework, enabled
through NFV, which automatically updates or revokes policy enforcements–subsequently
helping to reduce human errors on the network. Together, these features allow network op-
erators to create complete security/management solutions that incorporate both passive and
active network testing methods into an automated system for managing the state transitions




While network functions virtualization (NFV) is an established technology for many or-
ganizations, software-defined networking (SDN) is an emerging paradigm that is steadily
seeping into campus, government, and industry networks. As a result, SDN controllers are
quickly maturing to offer greater abstractions and more intuitive programming frameworks
for network operators seeking to develop their own network applications. Additionally,
with new network vulnerabilities emerging and exploitations continuing to occur, even as
the world grows ever more connected, these organizations are placing greater priority on
network security in order to protect their clients, data, and resources. Hence, SDN-based
and NFV-based security solutions are an ever growing commodity.
Because SDN separates the network’s control logic from its underlying switches and
routers (i.e., the data plane), many of SDN’s proponents argue that it provides network
operators greater flexibility, higher levels of abstraction, and rapid development capabilities
for new network applications. As a result, network management and network evolution are
greatly simplified under a logically centralized and programmable network. Accordingly,
it is the desire for network programmability and abstractions for network management
and security that forms the underlying foundation for this work–particularly along network
edge-devices.
In contrast, the tight coupling of the control and data plane within traditional network
devices makes traditional network application development more tedious, error-prone, and
expensive to manage. For instance, within traditional environments, network operators
enter combinations of low-level commands to update configuration files that reside on indi-
vidual network devices. As we will highlight in Chapter 5, such configurations can occur as
many as 1,000 to 18,000 times per month [1, 2]. Of course, with such repeated and manual
1
configuration requirements, network operators can frequently introduce new problems to
their network via human error. Accordingly, Benson et al. [3] observe that a large percent-
age of network outages are the result of configuration errors, which increase with growing
network complexity. Moreover, such configurations absorb additional cost (e.g., money,
time, availability, etc.) as network operators must first implement specified requirements
via command line interface (CLI) and then commit additional time to troubleshooting er-
rors that may not be immediately visible after the configuration is complete.
Additionally, due to the specialized and proprietary nature of the vendor software that
resides on traditional network devices, significant cost is associated with purchasing, main-
taining, and evolving such devices. Furthermore, waiting on vendors to modify their pro-
prietary boxes to accommodate new needs can often take months to years, and that is if
the vendor agrees to add the desired features at all [4]. In this regard, SDN and NFV of-
fer significant advantages to network operators and researchers in terms of rapid network
prototyping, equipment reuse, and the incorporation of new network protocols and security
features.
Accordingly, the motivations for turning to SDN and NFV for better network manage-
ment and security are many. Their benefits include reduced costs, ease of deployment and
management, better scalability, availability, flexibility, and fine-grained control of traffic
and security. Thus, we explore various security challenges and benefits of SDN, while also
providing novel methods and approaches that also incorporate NFV to provide better secu-
rity and policy management in SDN-based networks. Hence, we argue that SDN with NFV
can better empower network operators in the defense and management of their networks
with better tools and abstractions that allows them to rapidly address an ever evolving net-
work attack landscape.
Still, this work does not attempt to justify SDN as a better alternative to traditional
networks. In truth, we simply observe that SDN and NFV are gaining acceptance by a
growing number or organizations. Many of which, have already incorporated SDN and
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NFV into their network infrastructure. We also highlight that many of the network solutions
discussed in this dissertation have already been addressed, or could be addressed, using
traditional and proprietary solutions. In such cases, we highlight the state-of-the-art for
what has been done within traditional networks (and within SDNs when applicable) before
discussing our own solutions. In doing so, we evaluate several security challenges that
continue to plague network operators on traditional networks.
Yet, while these solutions often detect and block clients who violate network policies,
they frequently fail to consider how policy enforcements will be revoked or updated. Such
instances occur when a flagged client addresses a violation for which they are flagged or
when a client is flagged for testing and must next transition to a ‘deny’ or ‘allow’ state. As
it happens, no clear path exists for a client’s re-instantiation to the network beyond having
the network operator manually remove the policy enforcement or reset the SDN controller.
Likewise, the network operator is often involved in the process of transitioning a flagged
client from a state of ‘test’ to a state of ‘allow’ or ‘deny’, or some other combination
(e.g., transitioning from a state of ‘deny’ back to ‘allow’). As previously stated, these
requirements are tedious and error-prone. Additionally, these efforts cost valuable time that
could be better utilized for more complex network tasks. Hence, this dissertation offers a
security policy transition framework for reducing wait times and automating the revocation
of policy enforcements in SDN environments for clients who are approved to rejoin the
network.
As previously indicated, the applications developed in this work are intended for edge-
devices. Hence, they are intended to serve as a first line of defense in a defense-in-depth
security strategy for network operators. Likewise, these solutions also seek to limit the net-
work operator’s involvement in the setting, updating, and removing of policy enforcements
through the incorporation of an automated security policy transition framework. Further-
more, it builds off of this framework to offer active security testing methods that are also
automated through this transition framework. As such, the solutions offered in this disser-
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tation are not considered for application within the higher tiers of network infrastructure.
Instead, the developed applications of this work serve to aid network operators with net-
work management while also providing solutions for an initial barrier to network attackers.
We also contend that end devices (i.e., hosts) are not trustworthy resources for the applica-
tions developed in this work. Likewise, we do not believe host-based security solutions to
be scalable or maintainable by network operators. As a result, this work, with the exception
of its Trusted Agent, does not require host cooperation as do other security systems. Nor
does our work require changes to network architecture since security is implemented at the
switch via its controller. Moreover, our work is fully adaptable to cloud environments and
all components and functions of our work can easily be replicated via network functions
virtualization.
1.1 Towards Simplifying SDN Management and Security
Thesis Statement: Given that many organizations are embracing the software-defined
networking (SDN) paradigm in conjunction with network functions virtualization (NFV),
this work posits that frameworks for application development and policy management are
needed and explores the capabilities of SDN and NFV to better assist network operators
with creating network applications for network policy management and security. Accord-
ingly, we use SDN, aided by NFV, to offer a modular, programming framework and a
security policy transition framework to empower network operators with better tools and
abstractions to reduce manual network tasks and address evolving network attack vectors.
Within this system, we also introduce the concept of a Trusted Agent for assisting the SDN
controller with setting, updating, and revoking policy enforcements and with active testing.
1.2 Contribution
This dissertation makes the following contributions towards the defense of its thesis state-
ment. They include the development of a modular programming language and a security
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policy transition framework, the introduction of a Trusted Agent, the development of an in-
band communication technique for the SDN controller, and a novel method for detecting
rogue access points on a network using the webRTC architecture. These contributions are
now discussed.
Develops a modular, programming framework for the RYU controller. This dis-
sertation introduces Ryuretic [5], which is a domain specific language (DSL) for creating
modular applications atop the RYU controller. It offers high-level abstractions to simplify
network application development. Using Ryuretic’s abstractions, network operators need
only understand basic programming concepts to create robust network applications. Ac-
cordingly, this dissertation offers several modular network security and policy applications
that promote code reuse. Likewise, there is a simple and intuitive process for adding net-
work and network security modules to the Ryuretic interface that better enables network
operators to share their network enhancements with others. Moreover, Ryuretic offers ac-
cess to over 40 packet field headers, while rivals such as Pyretic and Kinetic offer access to
only 12.
Explores the use of a Trusted Agent to enhance SDN capabilities. Using NFV, we
introduce a Trusted Agent to facilitate both policy transitions and active testing within an
SDN. While most SDN security applications focus on blocking ports of offending clients,
little thought is given to reinstating the client in an automated manner once the client gains
approval to rejoin the network. In this dissertation, we utilize a Trusted Agent as part of
a network policy system that not only detects/blocks/redirects unwanted user traffic, but
also leads the user through a work flow to regain normal access. Additionally, the Trusted
Agent works hand-in-hand with the SDN controller to perform active detection on clients
who have been flagged by SDN applications for possible policy violations.
Offers the first SDN application to detect and deny rogue access points. While this
dissertation develops several applications that exist on traditional networks for detecting
rogue devices, including a couple for detecting rogue access points, it also offers a novel use
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of the webRTC architecture to detect subnets. Using developing APIs for web architectures,
the capabilities of SDN to intercept ports as they open (port-intercepting), and a Trusted
Agent to render webRTC scripts, this work demonstrates a new way to detect subnets and
reveal network address translation devices and rogue access points (i.e. wireless routers).
Develops an SDN to Trusted Agent communication protocol. One limitation of SDN
controllers is they only receive a packet’s header information. Likewise, unless the con-
troller has an east-west bound interface, communicating with the controller is not possible.
In this work, we develop a limited communication protocol allowing for the controller to
communicate with its Trusted Agent for policy adjustments and testing requirements.
1.3 Background
The tight coupling of the control and data plane within traditional network devices makes
security solutions tedious, time consuming, and prone to error [6]. On such networks,
operators are often required to interact with each individual device via a command line
interface (CLI) to emplace even the simplest network modifications [7]. Moreover, when
implementing security features, such efforts fail to capitalize on the header information
and state already available to edge-devices, and instead force network operators to rely
on proprietary solutions such as specialized middleboxes or a vendor specific CLI to ad-
dress issues on a per port basis. SDN holds tremendous promise to address many network
challenges. For instance, SDN is expected to provide lower cost hardware, faster upgrade
cycles, lower OPEX, and lower energy costs [8]. Additionally, SDN is already being lever-
aged for new products and features, including security. Moreover, major industry leaders
in telecommunications, digital advertising, and data are embracing this technology. Yet,
even as these organizations move towards SDN as a means to reduce errors and simplify
network management, handling policy enforcements and mitigating network operator con-
figurations remains a problem.
In some cases, the configuration burden is just moved from one format to another as
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organizations move from traditional network infrastructure to SDN. The result being that
the network operator is still responsible for addressing policy transitions within an SDN
environment. This can create significant and tedious administration challenges for network
operators. To highlight these issues and motivate the need for SDN-based management
and security solutions, the following sections highlight administration challenges, SDN
capabilities with NFV as an enabler, application development, and security challenges.
1.3.1 Software Defined Networking
In contrast to traditional networks, a Software-Defined Network (SDN) separates the con-
trol and data planes, so network intelligence and state are abstracted away and maintained
by a logically centralized controller [9, 6]. Simply said, SDN decouples control logic from
vendor-specific hardware [10]. Likewise, the controller is abstracted away from network
applications [9]. As a result, network operators are able to create applications atop the core
services of a network operating system (NOS) instead of its underlying infrastructure [11].
This process is much akin to how programmers create programs for computer operating
systems. The SDN paradigm also makes it possible for researchers to leverage OpenFlow
[12] switches to handle various security threats.
Already, SDN solutions have been implemented to detect and mitigate various attack
vectors like port scans [13], denial of service (DoS) [14] attacks, and anomalies [15, 13].
Unfortunately, none of these solutions offer a modular approach to implementing multiple
security solutions. Nor are they designed to work with current network protocols. As such,
they allow little room for augmentation, or they are not immediately adaptable by network
operators. However, if approached properly, the above security solutions could also be
included in an SDN-based security framework (e.g., Network Flow Guard) as modular,
add-on components that allow network operators to choose the features best suited to their
networks without being relegated to a CLI for its implementation. Accordingly, this work
capitalizes on two SDN frameworks. They are Pyretic [16], a python-based, modular,
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programming language for SDN, and Ryu [17], a component-based SDN framework.
SDN has also already been used to successfully solve such important problems as cost,
management, multi-tenancy, and high-entry barriers that limit innovation. As of 2015, 12%
of industry and 17% of Data Centers are already deploying SDNs [18, 19]. Some of the
reasons for SDN’s growing popularity include its integration of network fabrics and exter-
nal cybersecurity platforms to offer greater network visibility along with the enforcement
of domain-specific real-time policies.
Since SDN allows network operators to implement network applications at a higher
level of abstraction with the SDN controller handling packet decisions [20, 16], SDN solu-
tions can potentially replace existing hardware solutions (e.g., middleboxes). While mid-
dleboxes provide security, performance, and policy compliance benefits, they also require
considerable operator expertise and manual effort to deploy [21]. Nor is it trivial to deter-
mine the best means to direct traffic to appropriate middleboxes [21]. Resultantly, Sherry et
al. [22] observe that the number of middleboxes on today’s networks are roughly equal to
the number of routers and switches found on the same networks, regardless of size. Hence,
this work’s Network Flow Guard (NFG) framework provides the added benefit of removing
some middlebox requirements.
1.3.2 Network Functions Virtualization
While network functions vitalization (NFV) is not a primary focus of this work, it is a
key enabler for components, servers, and network devices implemented in this dissertation.
NFV serves to separate network functions from the physical devices on which they run
and is a key enabler for the components utilized throughout this dissertation. The use of
NFV brings with it significant potential to reduce operating expenses (OPEX) and capital
expenses (CAPEX) and facilitates the rapid deployment of new and agile services [23].
Likewise, researchers can use NFV to develop new architectures, systems, and applications
to further evaluate developing technologies and better understand their trade-offs, capabil-
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ities, and alternatives.
Traditionally, network operators have deployed physical proprietary devices and equip-
ment in order to achieve specific network functions (e.g., firewalls, load balancers, NAT,
IDS, IPS, etc.). These devices have often come with strict chaining and/or ordering that
limits network topologies with localized services that possess little agility and a strong de-
pendence on specialized, vendor-centric hardware solutions [23]. However, with networks
growing all the more diverse and requiring faster data rates, network operators often find
themselves in a short and repeating cycle of purchasing, storing, and operating new physi-
cal equipment while replacing and storing or destroying old equipment. Additionally, even
minor changes for a given function can require equipment replacement.
Hence, NFV adds value to this work by offering a cheap and flexible way to design, de-
ploy and manage networking services in a test environment. Using Linux-based containers
in a Mininet [24] or Mininet-WiFi [25] environment, this work implements a variety of net-
work functions: Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP), Network Address Trans-
lation (NAT), Wireless Access Point (WAP), web server, SDN controller, Open vSwitch,
rogue Client, Trusted Agent, etc. SDN is then used to provide orchestration to the switch
that interconnects these various virtual network functions (VNFs). As a result, this disser-
tation is applicable to SDN-NFV research communities.
1.3.3 Network Security
Like its predecessor, work in SDN has moved forward with little regard to security. This
has led some researchers to claim that the state of network security is abysmal [26]. As a
result, this area of research continues to present vast opportunities for researchers. It also
leaves much to be desired by network operators. SDN security essentially falls into two
categories.
First is the security of the SDN architecture itself. One can imagine a “stuxnet-like” [27]
virus designed specifically to hijack, shutdown, or corrupt SDN controllers. The impact that
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such a virus could have on an SDN is indeed significant. Some researchers already argue
that one weakness of SDN that impacts its commercial adoption is its inability to offer
security and dependability [28]. However, SDN is not alone with its security challenges.
For instance, traditional networks, have their own issues, and recent reports indicate that the
control plane of traditional networks is no longer as safe as once thought [29]. The second
category focuses instead on detecting and preventing malicious network activity. Such
activity can include any number of attacks capable of affecting or accessing the network’s
resources, services, and/or clients.
The work presented in this dissertation falls squarely into the latter category. Its so-
lutions work to detect network attacks that have plagued traditional networks (e.g., rogue
DHCP servers, ARP poisoning, rogue access points, etc.) and continue to be exploited. Of
course, Cyber-attacks are of great concern across all networks and they continue to push
the boundaries of both traditional networks and SDNs. The advantage of an SDN however
is that new security solutions can be rapidly prototyped and deployed without need for ven-
dor buy-in. So, organizations interested in detecting and denying a number of other attack
vectors, including advanced persistent threats (APTs), data exfiltration, malware propaga-
tion, denial of service, etc., can capitalize on SDN’s open source features to hasten the
development of security solutions.
Hence, this work provides a framework capable of supporting the inclusion of such
security measures into its framework as modular applications. Additionally, this work
leverages the capabilities of SDNs to exploit the state and header information available
to edge-devices on local networks in order to mitigate or eliminate existing attack vec-
tors and reduce manual network configuration changes. For instance, Network Flow Guard
DHCP (NFGD) introduces an extensible module for detecting and preventing Rogue DHCP
servers (see Chap. 2), and Network Flow Guard ARP (NFGA) introduces a similar mod-
ule for detecting and preventing ARP poisoning (see Chap 3). To handle more complex
security solutions Chap. 4 introduces Ryuretic [5] as a new programming framework for
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SDNs, and Chap. 5 introduces a security policy transition framework [30]. And, when
combined, the previous two chapters enable the creation of a security system for detecting
and denying rogue access points (RAPs) using both passive and active measures as we will
discuss in Chap. 6.
In spite of the solutions offered in this dissertation, its developed frameworks are only
considered as a singular piece of an overall security strategy for networks. Instead, we offer
it as first defense in a defense-in-depth strategy. Likewise, it has little applicability towards
network security beyond local subnets. In fact, moving this framework to higher network
tiers (beyond edge-devices) would thwart some of the security solutions implemented in
this work as we will discuss in Chap. 7.
1.3.4 Challenges To Network Administration
Computer networks are large and complex, many consisting of over 1,000 network devices
(e.g., routers, switches, firewalls, IDPS, and multiple other middleboxes). In spite of its
complexity and size, network configuration still relies largely on manual configurations.
Even within SDN environments, network operators may find themselves repeatedly inter-
acting with SDN controllers in order to reset the policy enforcements that are activated by
security policies. As a result, they need abstractions to simplify the development of net-
work applications and to enforce policies. Likewise, network operators need frameworks
that reduce their involvement with network policy enforcements and network configuration
changes. And, where possible, they can benefit from an ability to pick and choose which
network modules they wish to include in their SDN.
In this dissertation, we first demonstrate the capabilities of a modular programming
framework to couple applications together to enforce multiple network policies and im-
prove network security. Next, due to the limitations of current, modular programming
languages, we offer a programmable framework to overcome existing limitations of pro-
gramming languages (e.g., Pyretic [16] and Kinetic [2]) in order to introduce new options
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for network application development to network operators. Within this framework, called
Ryuretic [5], network operators can forward, drop, redirect, mirror, modify, and even craft
packets in a simple and intuitive manner. Additionally, the Ryuretic framework allows net-
work operators to create fine-grained network applications that target specific layers of the
OSI model. Once this programming framework is discussed, we then introduce a security
policy transition framework for SDNs that seeks to reduce network operator configuration
requirements through automation of policy enforcement revocations by using a Trusted
Agent. The Trusted Agent serves as an intermediary between the network operator, the
client, and the SDN controller and facilitates the transition of policy enforcements. Finally,
this work demonstrates how the Ryuretic programming framework, working in concert
with a Trusted Agent, can not only automate the revocation of policy enforcements, but
also expand the capabilities of SDN through NFV to provide active detection methods and
enhance network security.
1.3.5 SDN Application Development for Management and Security
One of the goals of this work is to minimize the SDN controller’s involvement with non-
routing/security related tasks. For instance, where some researchers have allowed the SDN
controller to actively perform all aspects of a network protocol, such as replying to DHCP
and ARP requests, this work seeks to allow current protocols to go unmolested by the con-
troller. Such functions are easily implementable as virtual network functions (VNFs) if
needed, otherwise, network operators can continue using the current servers and protocols
that already exist on their network architectures. In this work, the SDN controller orches-
trates the data plane and only implements passive detection measures. The advantage this
approach provides is the SDN controller need only monitor a subset of packets for various
flows, which saves compute for other network orchestration/security tasks.
In this work, two controllers are utilized. The first is POX [31]. The second is Ryu
[17]. While Pyretic is a valuable framework and serves as the foundation for our work (i.e.,
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Network Flow Guard) developed in Chapters 2 and 3, it does have significant limitations.
The POX [31] controller, thus the Pyretic [16] programming framework, only allows net-
work operators access to 12 packet header fields for matching, and this proved too much
of a limitation for more advanced intrusion detection and prevention methods (e.g., NAT
and rogue AP detection). However, Ryu grants access to far more packet header fields, but
lacks the modular design capabilities of Pyretic. So, to accommodate the modular nature of
the Network Flow Guard architecture developed in Chapters 2 and 3, this work introduces
Ryuretic [5] in Chap. 4 as a modular programming framework for Ryu [32]. Its modularity
means that programmers can easily create fine-grained, layer-specific, programs (e.g., load
balancing, IDS, IPS, traffic engineering, etc.) separately, and then integrate them into the
switch via the Ryuretic framework.
In keeping with our goal of minimizing network operator involvement and reducing
SDN controller loads, Chap. 5 introduces a Trusted Agent and a communication protocol
as part of a transition framework for interacting with the SDN controller. This framework
eliminates a significant weakness of it previous chapters–that being the absence of an auto-
mated revocation capability for policy enforcements (i.e., move from deny back to allow).
Without this capability, network operators must manually reset the controller or update ac-
cess control lists. Then, in Chap. 6, a new security system is created that capitalized on
the benefits of the transition framework where the Trusted Agent becomes an instrument
for active testing methods. Moreover, the SDN controller continues to orchestrate network
traffic and implement passive security measures.
1.4 Technical Approach
This dissertation essentially progresses in four phases as shown in Fig. 1.1. Throughout
these phases, this work transitions from simple detect and deny security applications to a
much more robust system for network security and management. These phases and their
corresponding chapters are now discussed.
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In the first phase (chapters 2 and 3), this work investigates the capabilities of SDN to
mitigate existing attack vectors (e.g., rogue DHCP server detection [33] and spoofing of
ARP packets [34]) along network edge-devices. We find that these solutions are easily
implementable because SDN makes a tremendous amount of state information available to
edge-devices. Consequently, this availability of state allows for the rapid development of
new, extensible, and inexpensive SDN-based solutions that augment a mac-learning switch
to mitigate edge-based network attacks. Moreover, these SDN-based solutions are easily
adaptable to current network infrastructures (and protocols) or cloud environments.
The second phase (Chap. 4), recognizes certain limitations of the framework used in
the chapters of the first phase. As a result, this phase introduces a programming framework,
introduced as Ryuretic [5], for modular, fine-grained, SDN application development. Ac-
cordingly, network operators are able to utilize Ryuretic’s abstractions to implement more
robust network security and management applications for their networks.
In phase three (Chap. 5), the weakness of the previous phases, which required the net-
work operator’s continued involvement with network policy configurations, is addressed. It
offers a Trusted Agent [30] to help automate simple security policy transitions and further
capitalize on the promise of SDN and NFV to reduce network operator workloads. More-
over, by introducing a Trusted Agent, automated network configurations serve to eliminate
manual configuration errors relating to policy enforcement transitions.
Figure 1.1: Evolution of dissertation concepts
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Finally, the fourth phase (Chap. 6), builds off the previous phases to introduce ex-
panded network management capabilities, and it introduces an active measure for detecting
malicious activity. These features are made possible by the Ryuretic programming frame-
work and the adoption of a Trusted Agent. Additional details are provided in the following
outline and subsequent chapters.
1.4.1 Outline
In the chapters that follow, this work seeks to understand current network operator needs
and address them in within the context of a SDN programming framework. As such, each
chapter seeks to progress these efforts from addressing established network security issues
using SDN capabilities to developing our own programming framework and eventually
incorporating additional elements, such as a Trusted Agent, to automate policy transitions
and aid active testing.
Each chapter also includes an analysis of an example SDN-based system emulated in
Mininet or Mininet-WiFi test environment. These results are encouraging and confirm the
effectiveness of our approach to enable network operators to leverage SDN’s capabilities
for their own applications, whether they be security, traffic engineering, or policy handling.
The work offered in this dissertation likewise offers a basis for further expansion of our
Ryuretic programming framework, and our Network Flow Guard security applications.
Chapter 2 - Leveraging SDN to Improve the Security of DHCP
Current State of the art technologies for detecting and neutralizing rogue DHCP servers
are tediously complex and prone to error. Network operators can spend hours (even days)
before realizing that a rogue server is affecting their network. Additionally, once network
operators suspect that a rogue server is active on their network, even more hours can be
spent finding the server’s MAC address and preventing it from affecting other clients. Not
only are such methods slow to eliminate rogue servers, they are also likely to affect other
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clients as network operators shutdown services while attempting to locate the server. In this
chapter, we present Network Flow Guard (NFG), a simple security application that utilizes
the software-defined networking (SDN) paradigm of programmable networks to detect and
disable rogue servers before they are able to affect network clients. Consequently, the key
contributions of NFG are its modular approach and its automated detection/prevention of
rogue DHCP servers, which is accomplished with little impact to network architecture,
protocols, and network operators.
Chapter 3 - Leveraging SDN for ARP Security
Insider threats are a growing concern for industry, government, and campus networks. Yet,
vulnerabilities inherent in Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) are exploitable by insid-
ers seeking to launch sophisticated attacks on local area networks (LANs). Such attacks,
initialized through ARP spoofing, include denial of service, server redirect, and man-in-
the-middle attacks. Unfortunately, the current state of the art technologies for detecting
and preventing ARP poisoning are tediously complex, slow to detect, and difficult to main-
tain. However, software-defined networking (SDN) enables the implementation of novel
security measures that are capable of detecting and eliminating ARP spoofing before it can
impact other hosts. Hence, this chapter presents Network Flow Guard for ARP (NFGA),
an SDN security module that augments simple, MAC-learning, protocols on OpenFlow-
enabled switches. NFG works by hashing a host’s physical address with an appropriate
port-IP association to deny ARP spoofing at real-time. Moreover, our framework’s key
contribution is that it achieves ARP security with minimal intervention by network opera-
tors while supporting both dynamic and static port allocations, requiring no changes to the
network’s topology or protocols, and requiring no client software installation.
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Chapter 4 - Ryuretic: A Modular Programming Framework for Ryu
We present Ryuretic as a modular, programming framework for SDN application develop-
ment. Ryuretic draws its inspiration from Pyretic, which already offers powerful, modular
abstractions for network operators; however, Ryuretic also builds on Ryu’s greater variety
of packet match fields and its access to advanced OpenFlow protocols. This framework al-
lows programmers to create new, extensible, and more powerful network applications at a
much higher level of abstraction. As Pyretic does with POX, Ryuretic places an additional
abstraction layer over the Ryu framework for network application development. Addition-
ally, its abstractions allow researchers to target specific layers of the OSI model and install
both proactive and reactive rule sets, without immersing themselves in the Ryu architecture.
Ryuretic is under continual development, and it is available to users via GitHub.
Chapter 5 - Security Policy Transition Framework for Software Defined Networks
Controllers for software-defined networks (SDNs) are quickly maturing to offer network
operators more intuitive programming frameworks and greater abstractions for network
application development. Likewise, many security solutions now exist within SDN envi-
ronments for detecting and blocking clients who violate network policies. However, many
of these solutions stop at triggering the security measure and give little thought to amending
it. As a consequence, once the violation is addressed, no clear path exists for reinstating the
flagged client beyond having the network operator reset the controller or manually imple-
ment a state change via an external command. This presents a burden for the network and
its clients and administrators. Hence, we present a security policy transition framework for
revoking security measures in an SDN environment once said measures are activated.
Chapter 6 - Leveraging SDN and WebRTC for Rogue Access Point Security
Rogue access points (RAPs) are unauthorized devices connected to a network, provid-
ing unauthorized wireless access to one or more clients. Such devices pose significant
17
risk to organizations, since they provide a convenient means for hackers and insiders to
hide malicious or unsanctioned activities on industry, government, and campus networks.
Yet, limitations inherent in traditional networks make detecting and removing such devices
expensive, time consuming, and difficult to implement. For software-defined networks
(SDNs), the risk of a network compromise due to RAPs is equally concerning, and meth-
ods for detecting RAPs within SDN architectures are needed. Hence, our work leverages
the capabilities of an SDN along with a Trusted Agent (TA) to detect and deny RAPs
access to networks by using both generic and novel methods with minimal impact to per-
formance. Three other contributions are included in this work. They include: 1) utilizing
an emerging web architecture (webRTC) to detect hidden subnets; 2) developing the first,
security-based, use case for Mininet-WiFi, a software-defined wireless network (SDWN)
emulator; and 3) enhancing Ryuretic, a modular programming language for SDN applica-
tion development.
Chapter 7 - Conclusion
This dissertation concludes in Chapter 7 with the following sections: additional results,
discussion, contributions, future work, and conclusion. In the additional results section,
we compare the abstractions and performance of this work’s programming framework,
Ryuretic, with that of other established programming languages not discussed in chapters
4 - 6. The discussion section provides a recap of the work conducted in this dissertation,
highlighting the evolution of this work from simple detection and mitigation schemes to
a complete security policy transition framework with active testing enabled. Next, the
contributions of this work are restated, and potential directions for this research are offered
as future work. Finally, this chapter finishes with a conclusion.
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CHAPTER 2
LEVERAGING SDN TO IMPROVE THE SECURITY OF DHCP
2.1 Introduction
Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP) servers are utilized across campus, industry,
and government networks by network operators to provide clients with an Internet Protocol
(IP) address, subnet mask, default gateway (DG), and other configuration information. For
networks having under-provisioned IP space, DHCP servers are especially important for
allowing hosts access to the network, and this requirement grows evermore as organizations
seek to embrace the Internet of Things (IoT). Consequently, this combination of under
provisioned IP space and the growing use of network devices (requiring access to network
services) creates a vulnerability that can be exploited by rogue DHCP servers.
We consider a rogue DHCP server to be any unapproved DHCP server on a network.
Sometimes the server appears quite by accident. A user might incorrectly attach a personal
router to the network via an open LAN port with default settings that answer DHCP dis-
covery queries with DHCP offers. Accordingly, when such events occur, clients connected
to the subnet may receive unsupported IP addresses and lose access to the web and net-
work resources. Of course, the assignment of this unsupported IP address may or may not
be mentioned in customer complaints. The malicious case occurs when rogue servers are
placed on the network intentionally and for the express purpose of directing victim hosts
to the attacker’s default gateway. This places network operators in a precarious position of
protecting network clients without disrupting their access to the network and its resources.
This is not an easy task on traditional networks where network operators must use a com-
mand line interface (CLI) to program proprietary systems at the device level.
As we will discuss in Section 2.2, configurations to prevent rogue DHCP servers from
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affecting hosts, when possible, are laborious and prone to error. Finding and blocking rogue
DHCP servers are likewise tediously challenging and time consuming. Therefore, network
operators require a new paradigm for designing and managing networks to remove such
threats [20, 6]. Software-defined Networking (SDN) offers such a paradigm and is fully
capable of detecting and blocking rogue DHCP servers. Consequently, the key contribution
of this work is its modular design and automated detection and elimination of rogue DHCP
servers with minimum impact to network architecture, protocols, and network operators.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the current state of the art
for rogue DHCP server detection and removal. Known work related to our research is
discussed in Section 2.3. In Section 2.4, we provide an overview of our project’s design
and implementation. We then discuss our test environment and test results in Section 2.5.
In Section 2.7, we discuss future work, and finally conclude in Section 2.8.
2.2 State of the Art
Current methods for preventing, detecting, and removing rogue DHCP servers from net-
works are laboriously time consuming. So much so, network operators can fail to im-
plement necessary configurations correctly or neglect them altogether. We now consider
in greater detail the methods available to network operators for detecting and mitigating
rogue servers.
Initial methods might include the direct configuration of network switches. For exam-
ple, provided network switches are capable of DHCP snooping [35], network operators
might attempt to configure trust relationships for all switch ports connecting to the DHCP
server, transit switches, and hosts. However, with a typical switch possessing 24 to 48
ports, such tasks are laborious for network operators and prone to error since configura-
tions must be completed for each individual port via CLI. Even within a vendor-centric
network, switches and routers support a range of features, which are rarely, if ever, uni-
versally realized by network operators [36]. If multiple vendor devices are incorporated,
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then configurations are further complicated. Even when all configurations are completed
correctly, a power surge or future operator error can still occur and cause a traditional net-
work switch to factory reset and remove trust relationships unbeknownst to the network
operator. Other proprietary solutions for server management also exist, but they call for
vendor lock-in and device registration in an active directory.
Once a rogue DHCP server is suspected, network operators must still employ a variety
of methods for locating the rogue server. For instance, diagnosis procedures include (1)
disabling the main DHCP server to determine if hosts continue to receive IP addresses from
the rogue server (or investigating host log files for a DHCP-server-identifier), (2) obtaining
the IP address of the false default gateway, (3) pinging the default gateway to populate the
host’s ARP table, (4) viewing the ARP table to obtain a mapping of the IP address and
the physical MAC address, (5) setting up a continual running ping to confirm when the
device is taken down, (6) opening and reviewing the list of MAC addresses contained in
the MAC address table of each switch until the offending MAC address is identified, (7)
identifying the port hosting the offending MAC, and if found, (8) shutting down the port
[37]. Of course, if multiple MACs are associated with the port identified in (7), then this
indicates that another switch is hosting the rogue DHCP server and steps (6 and 7) must
be repeated until step (8) can finally be completed [38, 37]. Moreover, step (1) indicates
that these methods will deny other clients access to the network while operators attempt to
determine whether a rogue server is active on their network.
Network operators may also deploy network devices and tools to assist them with de-
tecting rogue servers [38]. For example, network operators may use simple network man-
agement protocol (SNMP) to pull MAC addresses and ARP tables from the switch fabric to
find the rogue server’s MAC address [37]. Network operators may even use sniffing tech-
nologies like Wireshark [39] or tcpdump at various locations on their network to identify
the offending server. Of course, network operators may skip the location phase altogether
by utilizing a mass network configuration tool to apply new security policies. For instance,
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when a rogue DHCP server appeared on the campus network of Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology this past year, network operators utilized a Linux-based, multi-vendor tool, Really
Awesome New Cisco Config Differ (RANCID) [40], to deploy DHCP snooping across the
affected LANS and block the server. However, tools like RANCID still do not automate
the process for discovery and removal of rogue servers. As a result, operators are still
highly involved, either at the CLI level or scripting level, when detecting and removing
such devices from their network.
Regrettably, the above tools and methods represent the state-of-the-art available to net-
work operators. For a proficient network operator receiving an initial report, determining
that a rogue DHCP server is on the network may take hours to days depending on the size
of the network, location of servers, work priorities, and number of affected users. Addition-
ally, once a conclusion is reached, finding and isolating said server can take one or more
hours to complete depending on the network infrastructure [36].
2.3 Related Work
The closest work to our own is a relatively recent publication by Rietz et al. [41], which im-
plements an OpenFlow controller, based on the RYU framework [17], to offer rogue DHCP
server protection in virtual environments. Their solution is specifically designed to use the
OpenFlow controller to handle all DHCP requests. Thus, it is responsible for generating IP
addresses, subnet mask, DG, and other network information for all clients on the network
and allocating it to them via DHCP offers. As a result, no other hosts on the LAN are
able to detect a DHCP request (or offer) other than the requesting host, hence preventing
a rogue DHCP server from detecting or responding to DHCP requests. Regrettably, this
solution places an added burden on the controller by requiring it to maintain its own MAC
address and IP address tables. It also takes away compute cycles from the controller that
are better suited to processing flow requests and updating flow tables, which could affect
its scalability. Likewise, the extensibility of their model is in question since future updates
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and security additions will require significant changes or overhaul of the controller. Such
modifications could also affect switch functionality.
Our model, instead, incorporates its security features via a secondary module, which
matches on DHCP flows, and maintains existing DHCP protocols already utilized by tra-
ditional networks. This modularity allows the simple switch application to run on the
controller (performing its primary function of directing traffic flows) while security is pro-
vided by Network Flow Guard (NFG). This modularity further provides extensibility since
new security modules can be added as needed without modifying the existing applications.
Scalability is also improved as NFG does not respond to DHCP traffic, but utilizes the ex-
isting network infrastructure (i.e., the existing DHCP server) to handle DHCP protocols.
As a result, no topology changes are required by NFG, save an OpenFlow [42] switch.
2.4 Design and Implementation
In this section, we discuss how an OpenFlow switch, linked to a POX controller running
NFG, can replace existing switches. We also highlight how network reconfiguration tech-
niques, enabled by SDN, are utilized to circumvent rogue DHCP servers on a given subnet.
2.4.1 NFG Design
The Network Flow Guard (NFG) design enables existing network protocols so as to mini-
mize its impact to the current network topology. NFG capitalizes upon Internet standards
specified in RFC 2131 [43] requiring DHCP to use UDP as its transport protocol and the
Bootstrap Protocol (BOOTP) [44] requiring specific source and destination ports be used.
For instance, to gain a local IP, clients broadcast a DHCPDISCOVER message on their local
subnet from source port 68. In turn, DHCP servers respond with a DHCPOFFER message,
which includes an available IP address, from source port 67. Since multiple servers can re-
spond with a DHCPOFFER, the client responds with a DHCPREQUEST broadcast, which
notifies all other servers that an offer was accepted. By using OpenFlow’s header field
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Figure 2.1: NFG Implementation.
match capability, NFG monitors all port 67 traffic, uniquely related to DHCP services, in
order to validate that the correct server is issuing IP addresses to clients.
As depicted in Figure 2.1, we utilize the Pyretic [16] framework to develop NFG’s Cou-
pler (NFGC) and DHCP (NFGD) modules. The NFGC module couples our NFGD module
with Pyretic’s native MAC-learning (or simple) switch application. This coupling allows
the NFGD module to run concurrently with the switch application and is responsible for fil-
tering suspicious network traffic before it can affect DHCP services on the network. When
validating DHCPOFFERS, NFGD references a preloaded whitelist (maintained by the net-
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work operator) of approved DHCP servers. This list can also be updated at the operator’s
discretion. NFGC then combines the rules from the NFGD module and the MAC-learning
switch module and applies them to the POX [31] controller through its Northbound Inter-
face. The POX controller then interprets the instructions and uploads them to the OpenFlow
[42] switch via the Southbound Interface.
We choose to use Pyretic for implementing NFG because it is a modular, programming
language that allows network operators to implement network applications for SDNs at a
much higher level of abstraction [20, 16]. These abstractions allow network operators to
develop network applications that provide logically centralized network control as though
the SDN controller is handling every packet. For instance, these abstractions allow network
operators to target and match on virtual header fields, such as source IP (srcip), destination
IP (dstip), source port (srcport), and other metadata. After obtaining specific field matches,
Pyretic’s action designators specify when packets should be forwarded to the controller for
additional processing and when they should be routed to designated output ports.
Accordingly, NFG monitors all srcip and srcport combinations passing through its
switch fabric. Packets having DHCP field headers (i.e., having Ethernet type = 2048, proto-
col = 17 (UDP), and source port = 67) are passed to a DHCP resolver function, which ver-
ifies that the DHCP packet contains a valid DHCPOFFER, which is determined by lookup
table based on the network operator’s provided whitelist. NFG then develops policies for
arriving DHCP packets. If a DHCP packet is found to be valid, then the corresponding
action is set to forward the packet in accordance with the current flow table entries (set by
the simple switch application), else the required action is set to drop. The action is then ap-
plied to the global forward policy, which is asserted on the OpenFlow switch’s flow table.
A high-level view of NFG’s query and policy implementations are depicted as a flowchart
in Figure 2.2.
Predictably, network policies and connections can be highly dynamic and mappings
can change frequently–another reason we choose to use Pyretic [16]. Pyretic’s Dynam-
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Figure 2.2: NFG Flowchart for DHCP Traffic.
icPolicy class enables policy updates even as the control program is running. This feature
allows NFG (via Pyretic) to generate instructions (e.g., forward, encapsulate, or drop) via
its Northbound Interface to the POX [31] controller which passes interpreted instructions
to our OpenFlow [42] switch through its Southbound Interface as also shown in Figure 2.1.
2.5 Test Environment and Results
Tests were conducted using the Mininet [24] framework. For this environment, we utilize
an OpenFlow [42] enabled virtual switch connected to a POX controller [31], an ISC-
DHCP server [45], six hosts running a Linux Ubuntu 14.04 OS, and a Network Address
Translator (NAT). Note, we only depict four hosts in Figure 2.1 to minimize clutter in
our diagram. In this environment, we choose Host 2 (H2) to implement our rogue DHCP
server. Within H2, the rogue server is implemented using UDHCPD –a very small DHCP
server–to receive DHCPDISCOVER packets and respond with DHCPOFFER packets [46].
The valid DHCP server is initialized with a static IP address of 10.0.1.200/24. The
gateway router is also statically configured to be 10.0.1.200/24. All clients, including the
rogue DHCP server, receive their IP address, network mask, and default gateway address
via DHCP allocation. Additionally, for the purposes of this experiment, we assign the valid
DHCP server an IP address range of 10.0.1.10-30, and the rogue DHCP server an IP range
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of 10.0.1.50-60. While the range of IPs could have easily overlapped and encompassed
the entire /24 IP space, we implement our experiment this way to quickly identify the
legitimacy of IPs found in Wireshark [39]. We then run three separate experiments in our
test environment. In the first test, our network uses only a simple switch. In our second
test, we initialize our network as before, but with the NFGD module enabled. Our final
test begins with a simple switch application, but has the NFGD application enabled after
the network is in place and after the rogue DHCP server has affected hosts H3 and H4.
Wireshark is utilized from startup for all tests to monitor traffic flows to our OpenFlow
switch and our rogue server (H2).
During our first experiment with NFGD disabled, we observe that H1 and H2 are cor-
rectly assigned IP addresses from a valid IP pool. Next, after H2 receives a valid IP, it
initializes its rogue DHCP server and begins intercepting DHCPDISCOVER packets and
transmitting DHCPOFFER packets. As a result, H3 and H4 are allocated IPs belonging
to the rogue DHCP server, and our attacker successfully denies services to these clients.
In our second experiment, the NFGD module is enabled. Again, H1 and H2 are correctly
assigned IP addresses, and H2 initializes its rogue server, intercepts DHCPDISCOVER
packets, and responds with DHCPOFFERS. However, in this scenario, the NFGD mod-
ule accurately captures port 67 traffic departing H2 and blocks it, so the requesting host
receives a valid DHCPOFFER from the authorized DHCP server. The third experiment
simply tests NFG’s ability to dynamically contribute to network security. To do so, we run
the first scenario again with the NFGD module disabled. As expected, we receive the same
results. However, this time, without restarting the network, we simply reboot the controller
with the NFGD server enabled. We observe that hosts can now simply wait for their current
DHCPOFFER to expire or issue a dhclient command via CLI to obtain a correct IP since
the rogue DHCP server is again blocked. Additionally, since state is maintained by the
OpenFlow switch, flow tables are unaffected while the controller reboots, so no additional
impact to the network is experienced.
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2.6 Discussion
As we discussed in Section 2.1, campus, government, and industry networks are suscep-
tible to rogue DHCP servers. In fact, an Internet search for rogue DHCP servers yields
numerous forums addressing how to find and remove such devices. Often, the culprit is a
student plugging a wireless router into the LAN or a third party organization connecting
their network equipment to a hosting company’s infrastructure. Georgia Institute of Tech-
nology’s incident is just one of many frequent occurrences. Yet, such events can also be
intentionally malicious, posing far greater concerns and warranting expedited action. Such
attacks can DoS the network, steer clients to unintended servers, or allow the attacker to set
conditions to implement a man-in-the middle attack.
We also demonstrated in Section 2.5 that the SDN paradigm offers network operators
a novel means for denying malicious activity on their networks. Likewise, as previously
stated, we believe our new security architecture’s key contribution is its innovative use of
SDN capabilities to detect and isolate rogue DHCP servers before they have the opportunity
to affect other hosts, while requiring no changes to the current network topology, save the
incorporation of an OpenFlow switch [47]. Moreover, it significantly reduces the network
operator’s involvement in the process to simply updating the valid DHCP server whitelist.
Perhaps the most exciting fact is that, with no change required of the underlying topol-
ogy, NFG is a viable alternative for network operators looking to upgrade their network’s
capabilities. As for network operators who are new to the network (e.g., consultants) and
unfamiliar with the location and identity of the valid DHCP servers, obtaining this informa-
tion is not very difficult. For instance, we developed a program using Scapy [48] to generate
a DHCPDISCOVER query and then display all DHCPOFFER packets received along with
their respective server information. Similarly, Wireshark [39] and NMAP [49] queries can
be used to identify all active DHCP servers on the network as well. Once all valid DHCP
servers are identified, the network operator need only update the DHCP server whitelist for
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NFG’s DHCP module and activate the application in the NFG Coupler module.
We also envision NFG being relevant to other developing architectures, such as Software-
defined Exchanges (SDX), Hybrid Networks, and cloud and network functions virtualiza-
tion (NFV) environments. Small office/home office (SoHo) networks might find this tech-
nology helpful as well. Furthermore, we see great potential for NFG’s modular nature
to incorporate many other network security features, such as denial of service prevention
[14], detection and mitigation of port scans [13], intentional network monitoring [20] and
anomaly detection [15, 13].
Finally, while we concede that tools exist for detecting, locating, and isolating rogue
DHCP servers, there is no tool, currently available, that performs all the above functions.
Moreover, none of them do so without significant operator involvement. In contrast, NFG
automates this process for the network operator so long as the approved DHCP server
information is obtained. Network Operators need only upload their known-good DHCP
server information to the NFG’s DHCP whitelist and NFG’s DHCP module performs the
rest.
2.7 Future Work
While our initial findings are promising for implementing security on edge-devices using
SDN, other possible research directions of this work might include evaluating the effects of
DHCPOFFER flood attacks against SDN-based security systems, like NFG. As previously
mentioned, this work only considers security measures for traditional attacks. It does not
consider actual attacks against the SDN controller. As a result, such future research would
be beneficial and complimentary to our own. Additionally, network operators could benefit
from research evaluating NFG’s DHCP solution against other SDN-based security solutions
on physical networks and at larger scale. Doing so, would provide network operators with




In this work, we explored the complexity of defending against rogue DHCP servers and
offer NFG as an SDN solution for detecting and blocking these devices before they affect
the network. NFG is scalable because it works with existing DHCP protocols instead of
implementing them. It can also be utilized within established network infrastructure sim-
ply by replacing edge-devices with OpenFlow switches. NFG is extensible in that future
modules for denial of service attacks, port scans, ARP poisoning, anomaly detection, and
other threats can easily be implemented as independent modules. Still, despite our confi-
dence of SDN’s role in network security, it is likely that features such as ours may still need
to be incorporated as part of a defense-in-depth strategy that still requires middleboxes at
various tiers within campus, industry, and government network architectures. Even so, we
believe that NFG offers an excellent opportunity to enhance network security at the edge
for numerous, developing network topologies, including SDX, enterprise networks, hybrid
networks, and cloud and NFV infrastructures.
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CHAPTER 3
LEVERAGING SDN FOR ARP SECURITY
3.1 Introduction
Hackers continuously test the limits of tools available to network operators, making net-
work security a growing concern. While address resolution protocol (ARP) aids network
devices to locate the physical address of a provided Internet Protocol (IP) address, ARP
is also extremely vulnerable to attack, serving as an attack vector for hackers seeking to
masquerade their media access control (MAC) address as belonging to a legitimate IP ad-
dress. Insiders are able to exploit ARP to masquerade their MAC address as belonging to
other legitimate IP addresses by spoofing the ARP packets they send to victim hosts. To
do so, attackers take advantage of the trust afforded ARP-replies by spoofing ARP packets
destined for the victim host. Doing so causes the victim to associate a legitimate IP address
with the attacker’s MAC address. With this association, the attacker is able to conduct
denial of service (DoS) attacks, man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks, or server redirection
attacks. Although various methods and tools present counter measures to ARP poisoning
(e.g., static configurations, host software, and proprietary devices), few of these options
offer an ideal solution. As we will discuss in Section 3.3, current solutions are challenged
to address scalability, maintenance, cost, vendor neutrality, operating system (OS) com-
patibility, bring your own device (BYOD) initiatives, and power and space constraints.
Likewise, traditional networks, with features like dynamic ARP inspection (DAI), require
that network operators complete configurations on each individual switch in their network.
Instead, we propose to use software-defined networking (SDN), a new paradigm that
decouples the control plane from the switch’s data plane, to provide security and defend
against ARP spoofing attacks. In this chapter, we present Network Flow Guard as a mod-
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ular application that augments an SDN controller to detect and prevent ARP-replies from
unauthorized hosts. Our method does not require any network topology changes (save
an OpenFlow-enabled switch), authentication services, cryptographic keys, or significant
network operator support. Instead, NFG monitors dynamic host configuration protocol
(DHCP) offers, requests, and acknowledgments from valid DHCP servers to construct a dy-
namic table consisting of MAC-IP-port-fixed-state associations for each device on a given
LAN. Doing so allows NFG to leverage the capabilities of SDN to thwart ARP poisoning
attempts as they occur. Moreover, NFG’s key contribution is that it provides ARP secu-
rity while requiring little network operator intervention, no additional equipment or host
software, and no changes to the network’s current topology or protocols.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 provides background information con-
cerning address resolution protocol and motivates some reasons for securing it. Section 3.3
discusses the current state of the art for detecting and preventing ARP spoofing and ARP
poisoning. In Section 3.4, we first provide an overview of NFG’s design and implemen-
tation. We then discuss our test environment, our custom ARP poisoning scripts, and our
test results in Section 3.5. Related work is then discussed in Section 3.6. In Section 3.7 we
offer further discussion on the SDN paradigm and its viability towards security. Then, in
Section 3.8, we discuss future work, and finally conclude in Section 3.9.
3.2 Background
Switches operate at the layer 2 (i.e., the data layer) of the OSI model and handle communi-
cation between physical addresses. These MAC addresses are normally assigned by device
manufactures to serve as the device’s local address on a subnet. Even in cases where Host
A is on a different subnet than Host B, Host A will still use the MAC address of its gateway
router to establish a path between itself and Host B. However, this last action often requires
Host A to know the layer 3, IP address of Host B.
Assuming that Host A already has Host B’s IP address, Host A will utilize address
33
resolution protocol (ARP) to obtain Host B’s MAC address or the MAC address of the
device offering access to Host B, such as an intermediate router. This method of converting
an IP address to a MAC address is defined in RFC 826 and in IETF international standard,
STD37 [50]. Once Host A has Host B’s MAC address, Host A caches the IP and MAC
address in its ARP table. In actuality, the host generally checks its ARP table or MAC-IP
associations first, since previous associations are temporarily cached there. This is done to
reduce network traffic, however, in our above example, we assume the MAC-IP association
was not found. Additionally, the ARP-request is sent as a broadcast message with a MAC
address destination of FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF, causing it to be received by all hosts on the
subnet. Accordingly, the host on the subnet owning the requested IP address replies to the
ARP message with an ARP-reply containing its MAC-IP information allowing Host A to
update its ARP table and retain the information until it times out. Normally, machines
update their ARP table after receiving an ARP is-at reply in response to an ARP who-has
request, as depicted in Fig. 3.1. However, ARP can also serve as a simple announcement
protocol. For example, if Host A moves to a different IP address, it may utilize a gratuitous
ARP to have other hosts update their ARP tables. For example, a user can enter the Linux
command, arping A I eth0 10.0.1.200, and send a broadcast (i.e., ARP-reply) from that host
to all other hosts on the LAN to have them associate its MAC address with a provided IP
address [51]. Since ARP tries to reduce network traffic, it uses all available information
from arriving ARP packets to update its table.
Considering that ARP does not use authentication methods for ensuring valid ARP re-
sponses on subnets, other hosts can generate replies containing spoofed data and cause
other hosts on the network to update their ARP table with fraudulent MAC-IP associations.
Figure 3.1: ARP Request/Reply Packet Sequence
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Figure 3.2: Normal network flow.
Figure 3.3: Man-in-the-middle.
Additionally, ARP cache poisoning allows insiders to conduct various attacks (e.g., man-
in-the-middle, denial of service (DoS), or server redirect). We illustrate these attacks in
the figures that follow. Moreover, in Section 3.5, we implement these attacks using cus-
tom scripts and validate their effectiveness on LANs using an unprotected MAC-learning
switch. We then demonstrate NFG’s ability to detect and prevent such attacks. Fig. 3.2
shows the expected flow of data for Host A. However, through ARP poisoning Host B is
able to insert itself into the data path. Fig. 3.3 depicts the data flow when a host effec-
tively poisons Host A’s cache to associate the attacker’s MAC address with the Gateway
Figure 3.4: Denial of Service (DOS) or Server Redirect
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Router’s IP. The attacker now receives traffic from Host A, inspects and modifies it, main-
tains the distant end connection, and logs information of interest like user names and clear
text passwords, and other data. The attacker may also choose to simply drop packets that
are received in order to DoS Host A or steer Host A to a malicious server as depicted in
Fig.3.4.
3.3 State Of The Art
Each host on a subnet maintains its own ARP table (or cache) for mapping IP addresses
(layer 3) to MAC addresses (layer 2). Unless statically configured, modern network pro-
tocols maintain this table by monitoring ARP packets. As shown in Fig. 3.1, examples
of these packets include ARP-requests and ARP-replies. Unfortunately, ARP is a state-
less protocol [52]. Since hosts do not track the ARP-requests they send out or the replies
they receive, they will automatically accept responses without having ever sent a request.
Additionally, if these ARP packets are forged (or spoofed), receiving hosts are unable to
distinguish modified packets from legitimate ARP responses. Host devices then overwrite
correct MAC-IP associations with fraudulent ones. The result being that affected hosts for-
ward their packets to the attacker’s MAC address. ARP’s stateless nature and the fact that
it requires hosts to use MAC-IP associations already cached in their ARP table makes ARP
poisoning particularly effective against LANs.
Several tools, like Ettercap [53] and Dsniff [54], are available to automate the exploita-
tion of ARP’s vulnerabilities. A common attack is to mislead a victim into believing the
physical address of the network’s default gateway belongs to the attacker. As a result, the
attacking device can set itself up as a blackhole, a rogue server, or a proxy (or man-in-
the-middle). As countermeasures to ARP attacks, several defense mechanisms have been
developed. They include host/server software, static configurations, and proprietary sys-
tems. One software solution is Arpwatch [56]. It tracks MAC-IP associations and syslog
activities and then emails reports containing changes. It also requires that local Ether-
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Table 3.1: ARP Detection and Protection Tools [55]
net interfaces be enabled for pcap listening [56]. Arpwatch can be particularly affective
on networks connected via hub (since one machine can monitor all traffic; however, the
unicast nature of ARP responses cause Arpwatch to miss many ARP response packets on
switched (MAC-learning) networks [52]. If a network operator is to effectively deploy
Arpwatch, then nearly every host must have Arpwatch installed. However, network opera-
tors may have little control over all network devices due to bring your own device (BYOD)
initiatives, proprietary systems, etc. A similar problem arises with software compatibility
for various host operating systems on the network, and detecting anomalies on numerous
syslog files from each device is also challenging. These constraints make Arpwatch an
insufficient option for network ARP protection.
Two other available tools of note are ArpOn [57] and xArp [58]. They too must be
installed on all hosts. ArpOn is open source and available for Linux, OSX, BSD, and
Solaris. XArp has a free and paid-for version (XArp-Pro) and supports both Linux and
Windows operating systems. Both tools, ArpOn and Xarp-Pro, are able to provide detection
of ARP poisoning and protection. However, as with Arpwatch, these tools must also be
installed on all network devices to be effective, which is not a likely possibility in current
network infrastructures. Table 3.1 includes a list of other popular tools for detecting (or
protecting) against ARP poisoning with similar limitations [55].
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Still, some high-end (i.e., expensive and proprietary) switches allow network operators
to declare a single port as a monitor port. Afterwards, the network operator can configure
that port to have visibility over all other ports and then install a server to run an ARP
poison detection tool (e.g., Arpwatch) from that port for network monitoring. However, this
method removes one port from network use, calls for extra equipment (the Arpwatch server
is essentially a middle box), requires network operators to make manual configurations to
the switch, maintains vendor lock-in, and requires other resources, like power and rack
space.
Another option available to network operators is static ARP table configuration. Static
configurations cause the kernel to ignore all ARP-replies for IP addresses that are not stat-
ically stored in its ARP table [52]. However, this type of configuration requires that each
device on the subnet be entered into the ARP table of every device on the subnet that is
capable of storing static entries. While static entries can be effective and most versions of
ARP allow for a pre-created file to be loaded into each system [52], network operators are
challenged to continually distribute address mappings to each host on every subnet they
manage. As with other methods, static ARP tables are not scalable, and they present a
huge burden for network operators. Additionally, many networks, having a limited range
of available IPs, require some form of dynamic host configuration protocol (DHCP) to dy-
namically add new network devices to subnets. In these networks, static ARP tables are
simply too burdensome, and there are not enough IP addresses to ensure that only one is
assigned to each MAC address.
Since port-security, static configuration, access-lists, and other well-known security
features are not adequate countermeasures for ARP poisoning, Dynamic Arp Inspection
(DAI) was developed for some proprietary switches. Its default setting is that all ports
are untrustworthy and inspects ARP packets from untrusted ports. As a result, all ARP
traffic from untrusted ports are compared against a DHCP snooping database or against
ARP access-lists to ensure valid MAC-IP table bindings [59, 60]. However, this protocol
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must be enabled per switch and VLAN via CLI by network operators, and it is subject to
configuration problems. It is also a proprietary solution used by commercial vendors which
further ensures vendor lock-in. Nor can it be extended to SDNs in a controller agnostic way.
3.4 Design and Implementation
In this section, we discuss the goals, design, and components for our Network Flow Guard
(NFG) implementation. We first show how an OpenFlow switch, linked to a POX con-
troller using NFG, can simply replace existing switches and provide an immediate impact
to security. We then highlight how our design utilizes network reconfiguration techniques,
enabled by SDN, to circumvent ARP poisoning within a local area network.
3.4.1 NFG Design
Network operators require solutions that are accurate, extensible, and scalable. Otherwise,
these solutions have limited viability for network requirements. Hence, we adhere to the
recommendations presented by Song et al. [61] for deploying countermeasures to ARP
poisoning:
1. It must control the management costs of hosts.
2. It should minimize cryptographic processing.
3. It should provide timely detection and prevention.
4. It should be easily adaptable to current networks.
5. It should minimize hardware costs.
6. It must be compatible with ARP.
7. It should not slow down the ARP request/reply process.
8. It should consider all ARP attacks
9. Traffic should be contained to the network.
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Adhering to these guidelines, NFG is implemented with little impact to the existing
network infrastructure. It has no cryptographic requirements, and it can detect and prevent
ARP spoofing attempts as they occur. NFG’s only requirement is that it have an OpenFlow
[42] switch. As a result, it requires no topology changes or protocol changes for its imple-
mentation. It also utilizes traditional DHCP and ARP protocols to implement its dynamic
table and validate ARP packets. By utilizing the above protocols and only augmenting the
MAC-learning switch, NFG is compatible with other protocols and is easily adaptable to
other networks. Furthermore, by using host MAC addresses as primary keys for its dy-
namic table, NFG eliminates the possibility of multiple, identical MAC addresses existing
on the same subnet.
From the high-level view, NFG implements its security features by analyzing DHCP
and ARP packets, building its dynamic table of MAC-IP-port-fixed-state associations, and
matching incoming ARP-replies against the appropriate table entry. In Fig. 3.5, each
arriving packet is directed to the appropriate module based on its classification (i.e., ARP,
DHCP, or other). Of these modules, only the ARP Validator is able to drop packets. The
Dynamic Table Updater simply extracts the information needed to update the dynamic
table, which in-turn provides the ARP Validator with verified MAC-IP-port associations,
before forwarding the packet.
Since networks often contain a combination of both dynamic and static addresses, NFG
Figure 3.5: High level view of NFG Operation
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Figure 3.6: NFG ARP Validation Flow Graph
Figure 3.7: Dynamic Table Entry Steps
supports both static and dynamic port allocations simultaneously. This is accomplished by
allowing network operators to submit static MAC-IP-port allocations via a static-list file as
indicated in Fig. 3.6. This list is then added to NFG’s dynamic table at boot and protected
from overwriting via a fixed field permission check. The remaining entries are then added
via the Dynamic Table Updater module, and the table is used by the ARP Validator to
determine the validity of ARP-reply packets.
While building the dynamic table, NFG utilizes the MAC address of each network de-
vice as its primary key in the table entry. The row for each entry contains an IP address,
port number, entry state, and static (or fixed port) indication that is specific to its MAC
address. For security purposes, entries to the dynamic table can only be initialized by a
valid DHCP-offer. Only then can a host’s DHCP-request be used to assign a port to an
established MAC-IP entry and move the entry’s state to pending. Once the DHCP server
41
responds with a DHCP-ack, the entry is verified, and that MAC-IP-port association is then
allowed to submit ARP-replies. Otherwise, the ARP packet is dropped at the switch. Ad-
ditionally, as shown in Fig. 3.7, NFG limits interactions with untrusted devices by only
using DHCP-request packets that are bounded by DHCP-offer and DHCP-ack packets.
DHCP-discovery packets are ignored.
The algorithm for handling these DHCP packets and updating the dynamic table is de-
picted as a flowchart in Fig. 3.8. The updater first checks to see if arriving DHCP traffic is
Figure 3.8: DHCP Packet Flow Graph for Dynamic Table
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from the DHCP server. If so, the module then confirms whether or not the packet’s desti-
nation MAC (dstmac) is in the table. If not, then the dstmac and the destination IP (dstip)
are added; the port entry is set to None; fixed is set to False; and state is set to initialized-0.
Otherwise, packets from the DHCP server are either ignored, used to update MAC-IP asso-
ciations, or used to move the table entry’s state to verified-2. If the packet is determined to
instead originate from the host, then its source MAC (srcmac) is checked against the table.
If the MAC address exists and input port is not static, then the table’s current port and state
are checked. If the entry’s state is initialized-0 and the port is unassigned, then the srcport
is assigned to the table entry, and its state is upgraded to pending-1. Otherwise, the packet
is ignored.
3.4.2 Implementation
As depicted in Fig. 3.9, our implementation utilizes the NFG Coupler (NFGC) module to
couple the NFG ARP (NFGA) application with a standard, MAC-learning, switch applica-
tion. This switch is already a part of the Pyretic framework [16] used for our design. The
Figure 3.9: NFG Implementation
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Figure 3.10: Pyretic Query used by NFG
NFG coupler then allows NFGA to generate rules concurrently with the switch application.
These rules are then combined by NFGC and pushed through the Northbound Interface to
the POX controller, which interprets the instructions and uploads them to the OpenFlow
switch via the Southbound Interface.
While OpenFlow switches use three fields (i.e., packet header, action designator, and
statistics) to enable matching on any portion of a packet’s header and not just the dstip and
dstmac, these ‘low-end’ commodity switches possess limited memory and lack their own
dedicated control plane [42]. Fortunately, numerous SDN controllers exist, and we chose
the POX [31] controller for our implementation. Our NFG modules, however, are written
in Pyretic [16], which is a modular programming language that allows network operators to
implement applications for SDNs at a much higher level of abstraction. These abstractions
allow for NFG (and other network applications) to provide logically centralized control as
though every packet is being handled by the SDN controller. In so doing, virtual header
fields like source IP (srcip), destination IP (dstip), source port (srcport), destination port
(dstport), and other metadata can be matched to specific data types (e.g., DHCP and ARP).
When matches occur, they map to specified action designators that specify whether packets
are forwarded to the controller, forwarded to a specified outport, dropped at the switch,
or modified. A query can also be utilized to have specific packets forwarded to the SDN
controller, and we use this feature to target all DHCP and ARP-reply traffic. An example
code snippet for ARP-packet queries is provided in Fig. 3.10.
In the first line of Fig. 3.10, we begin a query policy that directs the OpenFlow switch
to monitor all srcip and srcport combinations passing through its switch fabric. The second
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line provides instructions for handling received packets. Line three provides additional
filters, so only ARP-reply packets (identified by ethtype=2054 and protocol=2) are received
by the callback function in line two. Finally, these rules are added to Pyretic’s policy and
pushed through its Northbound Interface to the POX [31] controller where it then updates
the switch’s flow table though its Southbound (OpenFlow) Interface as shown in Fig. 3.9.
Predictably, network policies and connections can be highly dynamic and mappings can
change frequently–this is another reason we choose to use Pyretic [16]. Its DynamicPolicy
class enables policy updates even as the control program is running.
3.5 Test Environment and Results
To test our solution, we developed a test environment within a Mininet [24] framework.
Within this environment, we utilize an OpenFlow [42] enabled virtual switch connected
to a POX controller [31], a lighttpd [62] web server, a DHCP server, six hosts running a
Linux Ubuntu 14.04 OS, and a network address translator (NAT) serving as an intermediate
router. Note, we only depict three hosts in Fig. 3.9 to minimize clutter in our diagram. In
this environment, we choose Host 2 (H2) to be our ARP spoofer/attacker. Within H2,
the lighttpd web server is running. Additionally, we developed a custom ARP attack tool
(henceforth referred to as ArpPoison) that utilizes NMAP [63], arpspoof [64], sslstrip [65],
and iptable manipulation to implement a blackhole attack, web server redirect, and man-
in-the-middle attack.
Using the testbed, described above, the valid DHCP server is initialized with a static IP
address of 10.0.1.200/24. The gateway router is also statically configured to be 10.0.1.200/24.
These static IPs are recorded in the static-list file. All clients, including the one hosting the
rogue host, receive their IP address, network mask, and gateway IP via DHCP allocation.
Wireshark [39] and tcpdump are also run to monitor network traffic and verify if ARP-
replies reach their intended victim.
To test our design, we run two separate experiments in our test environment. For the
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Figure 3.11: Dynamic Table
first test, we run our network using only a simple switch. In our second test, we initialize
our network as before, but with the NFGA module enabled. During startup for all tests,
Wireshark is used to monitor traffic flows through the OpenFlow switch (s1), the victim
host (H1), and the rogue host (H2).
During the first experiment with NFG disabled, we observe that after H2 receives its
IP address and ArpPoison is run that all attacks are successful. Not only does the attack
blackhole the victim, it successfully steers all web traffic to its rogue web server, and it
captures username and password information by running as a man-in-the-middle while a
user attempts to access a social media account.
During the second experiment with NFG enabled, we observe that the dynamic ta-
ble successfully maps all MAC-IP-port-fixed-state associations as depicted in Fig. 3.11.
Moreover, while legitimate ARP-replies are permitted, spoofed ARP traffic is successfully
detected and dropped at the port after NFG detects the first spoofed ARP packet. The result
is that one spoofed packet reaches the victim, but all subsequent packets are denied. Con-
sequently, the victim’s ARP table quickly drops the association, and the threat is contained
since the attacker is unable to maintain the flow of spoofed data packets to the victim.
Therefore, we conclude that NFGA successfully prevents potential blackhole, server redi-




While current tools and hardware for addressing ARP attacks are discussed in Section
3.3, it is worth reemphasizing that these solutions lack scalability, require significant effort
from network operators to configure and maintain, and introduce other requirements like
space and power. Unfortunately, the coupling of the control plane and data plane within
traditional network devices makes it difficult for network operators to deploy universal
solutions and research continues.
S-ARP [66] and T-ARP [67] represent research aimed at table server synchronization
methods. However, these schemes suffer from network compatibility issues with configu-
rations, administrative overhead, and protocols [61]. Nam et al. [68] developed a voting
scheme that relies on neighboring hosts, yet it depends on fair voting and requires infras-
tructure and operating system modifications. DS-ARP [61] offers a detection scheme using
routing trace to determine whether network paths have moved. It also requires that an agent
be installed on hosts and that a server be installed on the network to periodically perform
surveillance on ARP cache tables and report suspected ARP spoofing attacks to the server.
A routing trace is performed every time an ARP cache table is updated. Of the traditional
network solutions, the work completed by Philip [69] most closely resembles our own. In
his research, the firmware of a wireless access point (WAP) is upgraded to form MAC-IP
associations within a wireless subnet. However, this solution does not account for static
configurations required for wired networks (e.g., printers and servers). Neither is it easily
implemented on existing networks.
In contrast, a software-defined network (SDN) separates the control and data planes, so
network intelligence and state are abstracted away and maintained by a logically centralized
controller [9]. As a result, network operators are now able to work with a network operating
system (NOS) instead of its underlying infrastructure. Using this paradigm, researchers are
attempting to leverage OpenFlow [42] switches to handle various security threats. Hong
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et al. [11] observed that SDN is susceptible to a new form of poisoning similar to ARP
spoofing attacks on legacy networks and propose TopoGuard as a countermeasure. Yet,
they only address Host Location Hijacking attacks and Link Fabrication attacks by pre-
venting the SDN controller from receiving spoofed packets. As such, their work augments
NFG since it provides an extra layer of security for the SDN controller, while NFG focuses
on the actual ARP packets being sent to neighboring hosts. Sphinx [70] is a similar effort
to provide protection for enterprise SDNs by gleaning state and forwarding metadata from
OpenFlow control messages. Additionally, it extracts metadata from packets to build a flow
graph of MAC-IP bindings and a list of possible switch-ports. However, this appears to be
a secondary function of Sphinx, and it only flags possible ARP spoofing attempts while
NFG detects and blocks them. Also, since NFG uses DHCP to initiate table entries, only
one IP-port association can exist for a MAC address at any given time. Work by Kang et
al. [71] seeks to leverage SDN for cloud environments by capturing MAC-IP associations
as instances are created in the network. However, their work does not easily translate to a
physical network having both static and dynamic port allocations, but NFG could be easily
adapted to a cloud environment. Another SDN model utilizes an Enhanced Spoof Detec-
tion Engine (E-SDE) [72] to detect ARP spoofing, yet, it does not prevent ARP attacks.
Moreover, it generates additional traffic to confirm the legitimacy of ARP packets.
In contrast to the above examples, NFG requires no changes to the network’s topology
or any additional protocols, and it maintains a MAC-IP-port-fixed-state association for ev-
ery physical address on the network. Hence, the MAC-learning switch is able to focus on
its primary task of directing traffic flows while our security module implements desired se-
curity features. NFGC simply couples the NFGA and MAC-learning switch rules together.
Furthermore, by using this methodology, we are able to maintain the same base network
and ARP protocols already utilized on traditional networks. So ARP-requests and ARP-
replies all function appropriately with no modifications. This approach provides for a less
expensive, more scalable, and more extensible solution for detecting and mitigating ARP
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spoofing on a local area network.
3.7 Discussion
As we discussed in Section 3.1, most subnets (whether they exist on campus, government,
or industry networks) are susceptible to ARP spoofing attacks. These attacks can lead to
data breaches, data modification, loss of resources, communication interference, and much
more [71]. Accordingly, we developed our own custom scripts to exploit this vulnerability
on a standard MAC-learning switch. Yet, by using an existing protocol, like DHCP, in
conjunction with the capabilities of SDN, we are able to construct a dynamic table capable
of supporting both static and dynamic port allocations. Consequently, our decision to utilize
DHCP protocols extends our earlier work offering security against rogue DHCP servers
[73].
Ideally, we would have chosen to construct our dynamic table purely from the network
operator’s static list and packets originating from the DHCP server. However, DHCP-offers
and DHCP-acks only provide MAC and IP address associations–they do not provide a des-
tination port. Additionally, while this information could have been obtained from modi-
fying the switch application to update our dynamic table, it violates our goal of creating
security features that act autonomously from the network’s current architecture or proto-
cols. As a result, we chose to include DHCP-requests (which arrive from hosts) as part of a
sequence of events that allow a table entry to systematically move from an initialized state
to a verified state.
For our table, we also realized early in our development that MAC addresses would
have to serve as our primary key since they provide a one-to-one relationship with IP-port
associations. We initially considered using ports as our primary key since we also allow
for static port allocations. This configuration works if all ports map to a single MAC.
However, ports can have many associated MAC and IP addresses (e.g., virtual machines
that are bridged to the network). Likewise, most hosts do not have an IP address when
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they join the network, only a MAC and port, so MAC address proved to be our best option.
Additionally, we chose to implement a separate table purely for static port verification.
Hence, our design allows RFC826 [50] protocols to operate normally without interruption
while determining if ARP-replies are legitimate via table lookup.
We also demonstrated in Section 3.5 that the SDN paradigm offers network operators
a novel means for denying malicious ARP activity. In contrast, traditional network se-
curity features take advantage of the control plane being juxtaposed with the data plane
on legacy equipment. Thus legacy security measures are not immediately applicable to
software-defined networks where the control plane is separated from its network devices.
This difference in paradigms means that new security features are required to address old
problems like ARP poisoning. SDN switches are far too simple to implement the complex
security protocols offered by legacy network devices. Hence, our framework’s key contri-
bution is its innovative use of SDN capabilities to detect and isolate ARP spoofing before
it can affect other hosts, while requiring no changes to the current network’s topology or
protocols, and with minimal network operator requirements. These benefits make NFG a
viable alternative for network operators looking to upgrade their network’s capabilities.
Finally, while tools and methods for detecting and preventing ARP poisoning exist,
there is no tool, currently available, that is both scalable and easily maintained. They either
require software deployments or OS upgrades on all hosts, require additional equipment
or firmware upgrades for support, or require a significant amount of effort by the network
operator to configure and maintain. NFG, however, detects and prevents ARP attacks by
building its own table for ARP verification, and accepts a static-list file containing statically
allocated addresses.
3.8 Future Work
We believe our initial findings utilizing a Pyretic [16] SDN controller in a Mininet [24]
environment shows promise for future secure SDN deployments. We envision NFG being
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relevant to other developing architectures, such as software-defined exchanges (SDX), hy-
brid networks, and cloud and network function virtualization (NFV) environments. Small
office/home office (SoHo) networks might find this technology helpful as well. Further-
more, we see great potential for NFG’s modular nature to incorporate many other network
security features, such as denial of service prevention [14], detection and mitigation of port
scans [13], intentional network monitoring [20] and anomaly detection [15, 13].
3.9 Conclusion
In this work, we explored the difficulty of defending against insiders attempting to poison
the ARP tables of other hosts on the same subnet. Part of this work included developing
our own suite of attack tools (ArpPoison) to demonstrate the effectiveness of these attacks.
We also explained how Network Flow Guard uses the field matching capabilities of SDN
to detect and drop spoofed ARP packets before they can permit more sophisticated attacks.
Additionally, we demonstrated how our solution can be implemented on top of an existing
network without interrupting current services.
Since traditional methods for security cannot easily transition to SDN, security features
like NFG are needed to make SDN a viable alternative for network operators. SDN is
quickly gaining ground in areas of detection and mitigation, which include countering port
scans [13] and denial of service [14] attacks and detecting anomalies [15, 13]. All of these
functions could eventually be included in a security system (like NFG) as modular com-
ponents and allow network operators to pick and choose which security features our best
suited for their networks without being relegated to a command line interface for each im-
plementation. Such frameworks also have great potential to reduce the number of security
middleboxes on networks.
While SDN may not remove all security middlebox requirements on government, cam-
pus, and industry networks, we see great potential to significantly reduce the number of
such devices. Furthermore, Network Flow Guard (NFG) offers an excellent opportunity to
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enhance network security with vendor-neutral solutions. Building on this work, we have
released our NFGA security module, testbed, and ArpPoison software for further develop-
ment, augmentation, and expansion via GitHub.
3.10 Segue
In this chapter and the last, the security solutions both use Pyretic [16], which is an excellent
programming framework. However, this language is also limited. Since Pyretic sits atop
the POX [31] controller, which is only enabled for OpenFlow 1.0 [42], programmers are
only granted access to 12 packet header fields. Further complicating matters, Pyretic is now
listed as deprecated. So, no further expansion of this programming language is expected.
Another drawback to the work in this chapter and the previous one is that network op-
erators must manually terminate the security policy enforcements once they are activated.
Resultantly, a traditional and tedious requirement is still not alleviated for network oper-
ators. Moreover, this requirement still presents opportunities for human error to create
additional network errors as they delete clients from or add clients to their access control
lists.
Hence, then next two chapters, address a new programming framework and a security
policy transition framework respectively. The new programming framework and SDN con-
troller allows programmers to maintain a greater level of abstraction for their applications
while also achieving more robust management and security applications. Then, the security
policy transition framework allows for automated revocation of policy enforcement so that
network operators can focus on more complex tasks.
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CHAPTER 4
RYURETIC: A MODULAR PROGRAMMING FRAMEWORK FOR RYU
4.1 Introduction
Software-defined networking (SDN) [10] allows for a single controller to orchestrate an
entire network of switches, and OpenFlow [12] provides a single, vendor-agnostic inter-
face for these devices. However, while OpenFlow [12] represents the de facto standard
for communication between control and data planes, it lacks the abstractions needed for
operators to focus more on their desired applications than on the network’s inner-workings.
As a result, controllers such as POX [31] and Ryu [17], to name a couple, were developed
to communicate with OpenFlow switches via a southbound interface. Yet, even with these
abstractions network operators are not completely shielded from the complexities of that
are inherent in network application development.
The natural approach for these controllers then is to develop new programming inter-
faces. For POX, the Pyretic [16] framework was developed to create a simple, yet powerful,
abstraction using packet matching fields from various network protocols as shown in Table
4.1. Using this framework, users can build multiple modules and then chain them together,
either sequentially or in parallel, in a simple and intuitive manner. These features enabled
our earlier research [73, 74], which we discussed in Chap. 2 and Chap. 3. For both of
these solutions, we created a modular platform, called Network Flow Guard Coupler, using
Pyretic in order to augment a simple, MAC-learning protocol running on an OpenFlow 1.0
[12] switch with additional security applications.
Table 4.1: Pyretic Fields
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Table 4.2: Ryu Fields
Unfortunately, work for both Pyretic and POX has stalled over the past two years pre-
ceding this work. In fact, as of this writing, POX has yet to evolve beyond the incorporation
of OpenFlow 1.0 functionality, and it is still limited to the 12 packet matching fields shown
earlier in Table 4.1. These limitations proved a significant hindrance to our subsequent
work. As a result, we turned to Ryu [17].
Ryu is a component-based programming framework for SDN development, and as
shown in Table 4.2, Ryu gives programmers access to many more fields than does Pyretic
[16]. Additionally, Ryu supports all current versions of OpenFlow [12], which includes
version 1.5 as of this work, and it offers extensive documentation. Still, Ryu operates at a
lower level of abstraction than Pyretic and lacks its modularity. This too proved challenging
for our ongoing research and serves as the primary motivation for this work. Thus the main
goal of this chapter is to propose Ryuretic as a modular, programming framework for the
Ryu SDN controller. In doing so, we describe how Ryuretic is used to quickly couple mul-
tiple modules with existing applications to forward, redirect, mirror, drop, modify, or craft
packets. Additionally, aspects of our Network Flow Guard Coupler from the previous two
chapters are incorporated into the coupler we create for Ryuretic. Together, these features
make Ryuretic an enabler for network operators seeking to incorporate traffic engineering,
security, and other features into their network devices. Moreover, operators can implement
proactive and/or reactive applications as we will soon discuss.
This chapter is outlined as follows. In Section 4.2, we introduce the Ryuretic frame-
work and present a high-level view of its operation. Next, in Section 4.3, we discuss the
components of the framework and how they enable modular abstractions. Then, in Sec-
tion 4.4, we provide some motivating examples for modular application development using
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Ryuretic. Further discussion and future work are presented in Section 4.5, and we conclude
in Section 4.7.
4.2 The Ryuretic Programming Framework
To achieve its modular framework, Ryuretic provides an additional abstraction layer atop
the Ryu controller. As shown in Fig. 4.1, this layer (the Ryuretic coupler) interprets in-
structions from multiple modules and passes them to the Ryu controller via its northbound
interface. These modules can be either preexisting (e.g. the switch module) or created by
the network operator and incorporated into the framework via Ryuretic’s coupler. The Ryu
controller then interprets these instructions and forwards them via its southbound interface
to update flow 1 tables on its OpenFlow [12] switches.
The modularity of Ryuretic also means that programmers can easily create target-
specific programs (e.g., load balancing, security, traffic engineering, etc.) separately, and
then integrate these features into their switches via the Ryuretic coupler2. Researchers
can also customize their security features to operate at specific layers of the OSI model
and produce more specialized applications. Meanwhile, network operators benefit from an
ability to choose and implement the network modules most applicable for their network’s
requirements.
1A flow consists of an ordered set of L2-L4 header fields
2Much the same as the Network Flow Guard Coupler does in Chap. 2 and 3
Figure 4.1: Modules Joined Via the Ryuretic Coupler
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Figure 4.2: Ryuretic Framework
As mentioned previously, Ryuretic offers users the ability to proactively and reactively
interact with packets. With proactive measures, Ryuretic does not wait for a packet to
arrive. Instead, flow rules consisting of user provided match and operation specifications
are immediately passed to switches at startup. Currently, Ryuretic proactively supports
forwarding, dropping and redirecting matched packets.
To better articulate how Ryuretic reactively handles incoming packets, we utilize the
abstract forwarding model shown in Fig. 4.2. When a packet arrives (i.e., a packet event
occurs), Ryuretic first parses the packet and creates a packet object (pkt). This new ob-
ject, as shown in Fig. 4.3, contains a timestamp, packet inport, datapath (e.g., switch ID),
and packet header fields. Once pkt is built, it is passed to its corresponding handler as
determined by its place in the OSI model (i.e., L2, L3, L4, or Shim Layer). This allows
Figure 4.3: Ryuretic Packet Builder
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Table 4.3: Ryuretic Fields: fields[‘*’].
Key Summary
keys Key for fields object specifying packet header match fields**
ptype Packet type for crafted packets (Ether, ARP, IPv4, ICMP, etc.)
** inport ethtype srcmac dstmac srcip dstip srcport dstport
Table 4.4: Ryuretic Operations: ops[‘*’].
Key Summary
idle t Key for fields object specifying packet header match fields**
hard t Packet type for crafted packets (Ether, ARP, IPv4, ICMP, etc.)
priority Set priority for match-action rules
op
fwd Default forward packet setting
drop Drop matched packet flows
mir Mirror matched packet flows to specified port
redir Redirect matched packet flows to another port
mod Modify packet headers and redirect flows to another port
craft Create and send new packet
newport Destination port for mir, redir, mod, and craft operations
programmers to better target specific protocols in their applications. Consequently, each
pkt object also contains the header information from the lower layers (i.e., if a TCP pkt
is built, then it will also contain metadata for IP and Ethernet). Within each handler, the
network operator calls network applications to return the hashes (fields and ops) and then
passes them to match and actions objects required for the Ryu platform. So, when a mod-
ule is created, the user can choose to return specific match fields (fields) and their operation
parameters (ops). Both contain keys that map to specific fields in each object. The keys for
fields are shown in Table 4.3 while the keys for ops are summarized in Table 4.4. When
a user creates a new module, only the keys that hash to specific matching packet header
fields need be set in the fields object. Similarly, operation requirements (e.g., idle timeout,
hard timeout, priority, action, and new port) are specified in ops.
When fields and ops are returned to the coupler, it creates hashes (match and action)
that are passed by Ryu to its OpenFlow switches. However, the user’s only requirement
in this process is to instantiate their desired network modules to evaluate pkt and then
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Figure 4.4: Ryuretic Controller
update fields and ops to implement their desired flow rule. This process greatly simplifies
modular application development for network operators since they are no longer required
to implement Ryu specific programming constructs. Instead, new application modules can
focus purely on packet content (provided by the pkt object).
Fig. 4.4 essentially summarizes the actions that occur within the Ryuretic framework.
Anytime a match-action rule is not found in the OpenFlow switch, the packet header is
forwarded to the Ryu controller. The controller then generates an event, which the Ryuretic
coupler receives. The coupler then parses the provided information from the controller and
generates a packet, and that packet is passed to the Ryuretic interface for processing. Based
on the network operator’s defined applications, the Ryuretic interface returns two objects
(fields and ops) back to the Ryuretic coupler, which translates these objects into instructions
for the Ryu controller. The Ryu SDN controller then passes its instructions to the switch
via its southbound interface.
4.3 Ryuretic Components
Within the Ryuretic framework, examples of metadata collected from arriving packets in-
clude timestamp, ingress port, datapath, and packet headers. At the highest level, program-
mers are able to develop SDN solutions as class methods and call them via the Ryuretic
coupler module. When an event occurs, Ryuretic builds a pkt object using its packet parser
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library (Pkt Parse) and then passes it to applicable modules. This was depicted earlier in
Fig. 4.2. Likewise, Fig. 4.3 shows how the packet parser assembles the pkt object that is
subsequently passed to selected network applications, which are either created or obtained
by network operators. We now provide an in-depth overview of the components that make
the Ryuretic framework possible.
4.3.1 Coupler
The coupler component consists of two modules (i.e., the Ryuretic interface and the Ryuretic
backend or coupler). Together, these modules serve as the heart of the Ryuretic framework.
Additionally, the Ryuretic backend imports both standard Ryu libraries and additional
Ryuretic dependencies. These currently include Pkt Parse and switch mod, which are dis-
cussed in the following subsections. However, within the Ryuretic interface (Ryuretic Intf.py),
network operators can input code snippets at specified locations to support their design
goals. These locations are indicated as #[1] through #[5] within the interface file. In the
first location, the user imports desired libraries (if needed). The default import is shown in
location #[1] of Listing 4.1; however, the user can create and call other libraries from this
location as well.
Listing 4.1: Coupler Import
1 # [ 1 ] User can add d e f or c r e a t e t h e i r own f i l e from
2 ryu . app .NFG i m p o r t NFG
Listing 4.2: Coupler Object Creation
1 # [ 2 ] Add A d d i t i o n a l modules or o b j e c t v a r i a b l e s
2 s e l f .NFG = NFG ( )
Listing 4.3: Proactive Flow Rule Creation
1 # [ 3 ] I n s e r t p r o a c t i v e r u l e s u s i n g f o r m a t below .
2 # O p t i o n s a r e drop or r e d i r e c t , fwd i s d e f a u l t
3 d e f g e t p r o a c t i v e r u l e s ( s e l f , dp , p a r s e r , o f p r o t o ) :
4 # r e t u r n None , None
5 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . honeypo t ( )
6 r e t u r n f i e l d s , ops
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The second location (shown as #[2] in Listing 4.2) allows the user to instantiate their
application as an object, if using another file, or to create additional variables. However,
this is already set by default within the Ryuretic interface module. In the third location
(see #[3] in Listing 4.3), the user can provide proactive instructions to be installed shortly
after the Ryuretic backend (coupler) module performs its initial switch configurations to
have packets forwarded to the controller. As a result, these instructions are applied to the
OpenFlow switch at startup. The default value for this section is already defined to return
None, None; however, as shown in the snippet, these can be commented out and replaced
with method calls to load the hashes, fields and ops. These rules are then permanently
installed to the OpenFlow switch, which alleviates the controller’s workload.
Otherwise, when a packet-in event occurs, Ryuretic reactively responds by having the
coupler’s initial event method call the packet parser to create a pkt object. The coupler then
determines which OSI layer (i.e., L2, L3, L4, or shim layer) applies to pkt and forwards
it to the appropriate handler as shown in Fig. 4.2. Here is the fourth location where users
add code within the Ryuretic interface. For instance, if the user plans to call on a security
module and apply it to TCP packets, then the user may include code as shown in location
#[4], depicted in Listing 4.4. Here we also note that only the code located on lines 3 and 7
need be modified. In this example, line 3 holds the standard default method call for setting
fields and ops, which is required if no other module is called to set the fields and ops objects.
On line 7, a simple firewall method from the next location we will discuss is called to filter
IP packets. Note that the default method is removed or commented out.
Listing 4.4: Coupler Reactive Object Creation
1 # [ 4 ] Use below h a n d l e s to d i r e c t p a c k e t s to modules . . .
2 d e f h a n d l e e t h ( s e l f , p k t ) :
3 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . d e f a u l t F i e l d O p s ( p k t )
4 s e l f . swi tch mod ( pkt , f i e l d s , ops )
5 . . .
6 d e f h a n d l e t c p ( s e l f , f i e l d s , ops ) :
7 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . Simple FW ( p k t ) )
8 s e l f . swi tch mod ( pkt , f i e l d s , ops )
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Listing 4.5: Multiple Modules
1 d e f h a n d l e i p ( s e l f , p k t ) :
2 f i e l d s 0 , ops0 = s e l f . Simple FW ( p k t )
3 f i e l d s 1 , ops1 = s e l f . TTL Check ( p k t )
4 # Dete rmine h i g h e s t p r i o r i t y f i e l d s , ops p a i r
5 x f i e l d s = [ f i e l d s 0 , f i e l d s 1 ]
6 xops = [ ops0 , ops1 ]
7 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . s e l F l d O p s ( x f i e l d s , xops )
8 s e l f . swi tch mod ( pkt , f i e l d s , ops )
Ryuretic can also accommodate multiple modules acting on the same pkt. The user
needs only modify the names of fields and ops for each application call and store them in
the xfields and xops lists, as shown in Listing 4.5. These lists are then passed as arguments
to the coupler’s selection method as depicted on line 7, which selects and returns the ap-
propriate fields and ops hashes based on the network operator’s priority. This requires that
the network operator assign the highest priorities to the most restrictive rules. Subsequent
operation handlers use fields and ops to build match and actions objects (used by Ryu) be-
fore passing them to the switch module where flow instructions are created and ultimately
pushed down to OpenFlow switches via the Ryu controller.
In the fifth and final location where users modify the Ryuretic interface file, users can
paste or create their own network applications. These applications can be proactive or reac-
tive. Proactive methods, as seen in Listing 4.6, do not receive a pkt object as an argument,
however, they do return objects, fields and ops, to define the proactive flow rules for switch
initialization. Note also that objects fields and ops are initially declared as empty objects.
Listing 4.6: Proactive Flow Rule Definition
1 # [ 5 ] Add u s e r c r e a t e d methods below
2 d e f honeypo t ( s e l f ) :
3 # R e d i r e c t a l l IP t r a f f i c from s r c i p to p o r t 2
4 f i e l d s , ops = {} , {}
5 f i e l d s [ ‘ keys ’ ] = [ ‘ e t h t y p e ’ , ‘ s r c i p ’ ]
6 f i e l d s [ ‘ e t h t y p e ’ ] = 0 x0800
7 f i e l d s [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] 1 9 2 . 1 6 8 . 0 . 4 ’
8 ops [ ‘ p r i o r i t y ’ ] = = ‘100
9 ops [ ‘ op ’ ] = ‘ r e d i r ’
10 ops [ ‘ newpor t ’ ] = 2
11 r e t u r n f i e l d s , ops
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In contrast, reactive methods require a pkt object as an argument and may or may not
return fields and ops hashes depending on user requirements as specified in location #[4].
The returned values instruct Ryuretic on how long the new flow rule is to be maintained
in the switch’s flow table and assigns the rule a priority. Furthermore, ops[‘op’] instructs
the Ryuretic coupler to either forward, drop, mirror, or redirect the packet or even craft a
new one. A very simple method creation example is shown in Listing 4.7. In this case,
the programmer writes a definition to receive the pkt hash and then returns the objects,
fields and ops, to the calling method. Consequently, if a method does not return fields and
ops, then Ryuretic requires that these hashes be obtained via the default Field Ops(pkt)
call or other application within the appropriate handler as previously shown in Listing 4.4.
Additionally, users may still develop their modules separately in new libraries and import
them as demonstrated in Listings 4.1 and 4.2. However, these libraries must be created as
subclasses of the Ryuretic coupler.
Listing 4.7: Ryuretic Method Creation
1 # [ 5 ] Add u s e r c r e a t e d methods below
2 d e f Simple FW ( s e l f , p k t ) :
3 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . d e f a u l t F i e l d O p s ( p k t )
4 # b l o c k i n g w3cschoo l s and f a c e b o o k
5 i f p k t [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] i n [ ‘ 1 4 1 . 8 . 2 2 5 . 8 0 ’ , ‘ 1 7 3 . 2 5 2 . 1 2 0 . 6 8 ’ ] :
6 p r i n t ” W3Cschools o r Facebook i s n o t a l l o w e d ”
7 # t e l l c o n t r o l l e r t o drop p k t s d e s t i n e d f o r d s t i p
8 f i e l d s [ ‘ keys ’ ] = [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ]
9 f i e l d s [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] = p k t [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ]
10 ops [ ‘ p r i o r i t y ’ ] = 100
11 ops [ ‘ op ’ ] = ‘ drop ’
12 r e t u r n f i e l d s , ops
4.3.2 Packet Parser
In addition to the fields shown in Table 4.2, the Pkt parse module also adds a timestamp,
switch input port number, and datapath information to a created pkt object. For Ryuretic,
the timestamp always indicates the first instance of a pkt object in the Ryuretic frame-
work. That is to say that pkts are stamped at the time the controller receives them from
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Table 4.5: Ryuretic Pkt Object: pkt[‘*’]
the switch. With the timestamp, users can calculate round trip time (RTT) estimates, inter-
packet arrival times (IAT), etc. Like Pyretic, Ryuretic allows users to extract header fields
via the pkt object’s keys. For instance, pkt[‘srcip’] will return the IP address of the packet’s
source network device while pkt[‘dstmac’] will provide the MAC address of the packet’s
intended destination. Table 4.5 provides some of the fields available to the user. As of this
work, header fields for IPv6 and DHCP packets are withheld for future work. By including
switch identification information in pkt, Ryuretic also supports the orchestration of mul-
tiple switches. Likewise, the inclusion of the inport allows network operators to quickly
build port-MAC-IP associations, which are helpful for building targeted security features.
Additionally, each pkt contains all needed information to allow network operators to
work with packets transiting L2-L4 of the OSI model. The Ryuretic coupler uses this fea-
ture to segregate incoming packets into their appropriate OSI layer handler. For instance, if
an IP packet arrives, the created pkt will also contain Ethernet fields as well as the IP fields.
If a TCP packet arrives, then the corresponding object will contain TCP, IP, and Ethernet
information. This feature allows network researchers to implement an entire gambit of fea-
tures impacting multiple layers of the OSI model for each packet regardless of the layer for
which it is intended.
4.3.3 Switch Module
The switch module (switch mod) is a modified version of the mac-learning switch origi-
nally provided with the Ryu controller software. However, its event declarations and its
direct interaction with OpenFlow switches have been removed. It now simply builds and
maintains a simple, MAC-learning table which the coupler accesses before generating its
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own flow table updates. As a result, this file requires no additional modifications, but it
must be included with the Ryuretic framework in order to maintain basic switch function-
ality.
4.4 Ryuretic Programming Examples
To better demonstrate Ryuretic as an enabler for network or security applications, we exam-
ine two, simple use cases for this framework. In the first, we implement a stateful firewall.
Then, in the second, we implement an unauthorized NAT detection solution.
4.4.1 Simple Stateful Firewall Application
One feature network operators may be interested in is isolating their network from outside
entities. This can be accomplished by using SDN to implement a stateful firewall. Doing so
can ensure that outside network devices are unable to establish an IP connection with local
hosts unless a host initiates the connection. Hence, two scenarios occur in our model and
shown in Fig. 4.5. In the first scenario, a host generates a get request for an external server,
and the external IP is stored. When the external device responds its stored IP is found, and
its packets are allowed. In the second scenario, an outside IP attempts to contact a host on
the subnet without first being contacted. In this scenario, the packet is dropped.
Figure 4.5: Stateful Firewall Event Sequence
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Listing 4.8: Ryuretic Object Creation
1 # [ 2 ] D e c l a r e any g l o b a l v a r i a b l e h e r e
2 s e l f . s t a t F w t b l = {}
To implement this application, we first create a table in location #[2] (see Listing 4.8).
In this example, there is no requirement to add any imports. We then create the method
that will handle Ryuretic’s pkt object in the location #[5] (see Listing 4.9). As with other
methods, line 2 immediately sets faults and ops to their default values. As indicated on line
three of Listing 4.9, the port connecting to external network traffic is port 10. Therefore,
all other ports connected to the switch are considered local.
Listing 4.9: Ryuretic Method Creation
1 # [ 5 ] Add u s e r c r e a t e d methods below
2 d e f S t a t e f u l F W ( s e l f , p k t ) :
3 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . d e f a u l t F i e l d O p s ( p k t )
4 i f p k t [ ‘ i n p u t ’ ] != 1 0 :
5 i f s e l f . s t a t F w t b l . h a s k e y ( p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] ) :
6 i f l e n ( s e l f . s t a t F w t b l [ p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] ] [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] ) > 4 :
7 s e l f . s t a t F w t b l [ p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] ] [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] . pop ( 3 )
8 s e l f . s t a t F w t b l [ p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] ] [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] . append ( \
9 p k t [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] )
10 e l s e :
11 s e l f . s t a t F w t b l [ p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] ] = { ‘ d s t i p ’ : [ p k t [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] ] }
12 r e t u r n f i e l d s , ops
13 e l s e :
14 i f s e l f . s t a t F w t b l . h a s k e y ( p k t [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] ) :
15 i f p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] in s t a t F w t b l [ p k t [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] ] [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] :
16 r e t u r n f i e l d s , ops
17 e l s e :
18 f i e l d s ‘ keys ’ ] = [ ‘ s r c i p ’ , ‘ d s t i p ’ ]
19 f i e l d s [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] = p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ]
20 f i e l d s [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ] = p k t [ ‘ d s t i p ’ ]
21 ops [ ‘ p r i o r i t y ’ ] , ops [ ‘ op ’ ] = 100 , ‘ drop ’
22 ops [ ‘ h a r d t ’ ] , ops [ ‘ i d l e t ’ ] = 20 , 4
23 r e t u r n f i e l d s , ops
If an IP packet originates from any of these ports, then the application first checks
to determine if the source IP (srcip) has already been entered into the state firewall table
(stat Fw tbl). If not, the initial srcip and destination IP (dstip) values are entered. Other-
wise, the table is updated by appending a new (dstip) to the list contained in stat Fw tbl.
To prevent the table from growing too large, the table also limits the number of dstips that
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may be stored at one time by dynamically dropping IPs using the ’first in first out’ (FIFO)
queuing method.
When a packet-in does occur on port 10, the application then performs a reverse table
lookup to determine if the dstip (a local host address) has the packet’s srcip stored in the
state firewall table. If so, the packet traverses the switch normally. If not, the application
modifies fields and ops to drop the packet. In this case, fields is set to match on the packet’s
srcip and dstip. Then as shown in lines 19-21, priority, op, hard t, and idle t keys are set.
In this case, the corresponding flow update has a priority of 100, a rule to drop matched
packets, and an arbitrary duration of no more than 20 seconds total or four seconds if the
IP address becomes idle.
Listing 4.10: Ryuretic FW Method Call
1 d e f h a n d l e t c p ( s e l f , p k t ) :
2 # f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . d e f a u l t F i e l d O p s ( p k t )
3 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . S t a t e f u l F W ( p k t )
4 s e l f . swi tch mod ( pkt , f i e l d s , ops )
Once updates to Ryuretic’s method library are complete, the user then updates the cou-
pler module as follows. First, if the method library is used, the code snippets for sections
#[1] and #[3] of the Ryuretic interface module remain the same as shown in Listings 4.1
and 4.3. Location #[2] must have the global variable stat Fw tbl instantiated as was done
in Listing 4.8. The only other change to the interface file is in location #[4] (see Listing
4.10). Note that the default method for setting fields and ops is commented out. Instead,
it is replaced with a call to the previously created Stateful FW module. Note also that this
application is called from the TCP handler within the coupler, so only TCP packets are
affected by this security feature.
4.4.2 Unauthorized NAT device
Unauthorized network address translation (NAT) devices can also compromise local net-
works. One way to detect these devices is to monitor IP packets for decremented time-
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to-live (TTL) header fields [75]. In this example, the nat detect module in Listing 4.11
inspects the TTL field of each IP packet passing through the switch, which is something
we could not accomplish with Pyretic due to its limited number of header fields. Now,
building the NAT detector module is a fairly straightforward process. We first observe that
most network devices have TTL values of 64 or 128. If hosts are directly connected to the
switch, then the switch should detect one of the prior values. However, if these devices are
connected to a NAT device, then the switch will detect the decremented TTL.
Listing 4.11: Ryuretic NAT Detection Method Creation
1 # Block IP p a c k e t s with dec remen ted TTL
2 d e f TTL Check ( s e l f , p k t ) :
3 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . d e f a u l t F i e l d O p s ( p k t )
4 i f p k t [ ‘ t t l ’ ] == 63 or p k t [ ‘ t t l ’ ] == 127 :
5 p r i n t ”XxXxXx NAT D e t e c t e d xXxXxX”
6 # drop a l l p a c k e t s from p o r t with TTL dec remen t
7 f i e l d s [ ‘ keys ’ ] = [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ]
8 f i e l d s [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ] = p k t [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ]
9 ops [ ‘ p r i o r i t y ’ ] = 100
10 ops [ ‘ op ’ ] = ‘ drop ’
11 r e t u r n f i e l d s , ops
As before, we first load fields and ops using the default Field Ops method. We next
evaluate the TTL field of the provided pkt. If the TTL is equal to 63 or 127, then a TTL
decrement has occurred and an unauthorized NAT device is detected. As a result, the
application modifies keys in the fields hash to indicate that the inport is the only match
requirement. It also updates the inport key with the port number of the connected NAT
device. It then updates the ops hash to indicate that packets from the offending port should
be dropped with a priority of 100. In this example, we do not provide a duration for the
flow rule, so the rule is not installed on the OpenFlow switch. The result is that all packets
continue to be sent to the controller for decision. Ideally, the network operator would install
the flows to reduce the burden to the controller. Of course, if the packet passes the TTL
test, then the default fields and ops objects are returned to the coupler for basic routing.
Now that the method has been created in the method library, the user needs only update the
TCP handle in location #[4] of the coupler module as demonstrated previously.
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4.5 Discussion
While Ryuretic was initially created to support our own work, we quickly realized that net-
work operators, researchers, educators, and students could all benefit from an intuitively
simple tool for network application development. Moreover, Ryuretic’s abstractions ob-
fuscate the complexities and modularity constraints of Ryu [17] while allowing users to
handle packet header fields in a manner similar to Pyretic [16]. Ryuretic is less generalized
and slightly more restrictive than Pyretic (lacking the ability to combine rule sets via cross
product); yet, it does not generate excess rules either. Furthermore, it grants users access
to all current OpenFlow [12] protocols.
Consequently, a more recent development with Pyretic adds greater value to our work.
While some researchers (ourselves included) awaited updates to the Pyretic platform to
utilize OpenFlow 1.3 and higher, support for Pyretic fell off over the last two years. Re-
grettably, as of October 20163, the Pyretic programming framework is listed as deprecated
and no longer supported.
With Ryuretic, operators need only develop a rudimentary understanding of the Python
programming language to utilize its lists, dictionaries, and methods to implement their net-
work applications. Likewise, the use of the pkt, fields, and ops objects in Ryuretic greatly
simplifies application development; however, users must still understand network opera-
tions, header fields, and the OSI model to intuit and handle network packets appropriately.
Ryuretic is already enabling the development of modular security applications to detect and
mitigate rogue access points (RAPs) and unauthorized network address translation (NAT)
devices in SDN environments.
Additionally, Ryuretic is already being used to teach software-defined networking in
one graduate level networking course offered by the Georgia Institute of Technology, and
Ryuretic is currently facilitating at least one master’s project at the Universiti Putra Malaysia
3Date is an approximation based on results obtained from https://web.archive.org/web/
*/http://frenetic-lang.org/pyretic/. May 2016 was the last month recorded that showed
Pyretic as still being supported.
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(UPM). Also, as shown in Fig. 4.6, Ryuretic Labs, which is available through GitHub4
provides instructions for setting up Ryuretic along with instructional project-oriented lab
exercises.
4.6 Future Work
Presently, we are working to expand Ryuretic’s packet parser to include IPv6, DHCP, and
LLDP fields in its pkt object. There is also room to parallelize functions within Ryuretic
to improve performance when handling multiple modules. With the packet crafting feature
allowed by Ryuretic, we are also seeking to enable new ways for Ryuretic to communicate
with trusted entities on the network. We believe the incorporation of such communication
protocols will enable more robust network management and security options for network
operators. Still, as it is, we believe that the Ryuretic framework serves as a useful tool for
users seeking to develop, modular, network applications. The Ryuretic platform and its
subsequent versions and applications are also available to users via GitHub5
4Available at https://github.com/Ryuretic/RyureticLabs.
5https://github.com/Ryuretic/Ryuretic
Figure 4.6: Ryuretic Labs
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4.7 Conclusion
With OpenFlow providing a vendor agnostic platform for SDNs and enabling the orchestra-
tion of numerous switches, programmers are able to implement novel network applications
for security and traffic engineering. Yet, network operators still need abstractions to en-
able network application development without its associated complexities. Towards this
effort, we offer Ryuretic as a novel, modular, SDN-based framework that enhances the Ryu
controller platform with abstractions that greatly simplify application development. In ad-
dition, Ryuretic allows network operators to selectively interact with packets from layers
L2, L3, and L4 of the OSI model using both proactive and reactive measures. Additionally,
Ryuretic limits operator involvement to evaluating packet headers, choosing match fields,
and selecting a desired operation. Furthermore, Ryuretic’s modular nature offers network
operators an extensible platform for providing further network enhancements.
4.8 Segue
One of the limitations that Ryuretic still fails to address for network operators is an abil-
ity to automate the updating of policy enforcements. As a result, network operators are
still creating policies that require their manual intervention to change. However, Ryuretic’s
packet crafting feature serves as a key enabler to create such an option. In the following
chapter, we will incorporate a virtual entity called a Trusted Agent to serve as an inter-
mediary between the network operator and the SDN controller to better automate network
security policy transitions and avoid network operator errors.
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CHAPTER 5
SECURITY POLICY TRANSITION FRAMEWORK FOR SOFTWARE-DEFINED
NETWORKS
5.1 Introduction
Software-defined Networking (SDN) [10] allows for a single controller to orchestrate an
entire network of switches, and OpenFlow [12] provides a single, vendor-agnostic interface
for these devices. Additionally, other frameworks, like Pyretic [16] and Ryuretic [5], pro-
vide abstractions that shield network operators from the complexities inherent in network
application development. However, operators also require frameworks to reverse security
measures (e.g. blocking ports and redirecting or dropping traffic flows) once they are trig-
gered. Unfortunately, once a system is flagged for a security (or compliance) violation,
revoking the implemented security measure in these solutions is not possible without re-
setting the controller or requiring the network operator to manually reinstate the client’s
privileges via a script or external command.
As Kim et al. [1, 2] observe, network operators may already be responsible for as many
as 18,000 network configuration changes per month (much of which deals with adding,
modifying, or deleting entries in access control lists) on traditional networks. Additionally,
with each configuration comes the opportunity to introduce a new network error. Further-
more, managing and maintaining ACLs that can contain nearly 10,000 entries and see as
many as 4,000 changes per year1 is a burdensome challenge [1]. Moreover, if network
operators must manually revoke triggered security measures on SDN controllers, then this
too becomes another cumbersome task for many network operators who lack actual pro-
gramming experience as Kim et al. [2] observe.
1Discussed values pertain to a study involving two universities.
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Hence, security policy transition frameworks, such as the one we have implemented and
describe in this chapter, can greatly assist network operators and their clients by automating
security policy transitions. Such a framework offers substantial benefits. First, it reduces
the network operator’s configuration requirements that subject the network to additional
errors and delay the execution of more critical tasks. Second, clients receive automatic
notification of their violation and instructions for regaining their network privileges. Third,
it eliminates erroneous trouble tickets by informing both clients and administrators of the
violation. Finally, depending on the violation and validation requirement, it reduces the
total time required to reinstate a client’s network privileges. Having triggered a security
policy, the client need only enter a passkey into a provided web interface to regain their
privileges. Of course, while implemented using OpenFlow, this framework could be built
atop other architectures as well. It is also easily implementable with virtual switches.
This chapter is outlined as follows. We first discuss the motivation for our framework
in Section 5.2 and related work in Section 5.3. Next, in Section 5.4, we discuss our frame-
work. Then, we discuss our test environment in Section 5.5 and an example use case in
Section 5.6. We then offer further discussion in Section 5.7 and conclude in Section 5.8.
5.2 Framework Motivation
The primary motivation of this work is to reduce network operator involvement with re-
peated network reconfigurations. We now present a few examples for how automating
security policy transitions alleviate this burden. Also, in cases where the process cannot
be completely automated, we suggest that a less-skilled help desk attendant be utilized to
further reduce network operator involvement. For instance, patch compliance and policy
violations can potentially be completely automated, while infected computers that require
operating system reinstalls can potentially be handled by help desk personnel. A high-level
view for this framework is depicted in Fig. 5.1.
In our framework, the network operator sets the security policies for the controller as
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Figure 5.1: Security Policy Transition Framework
shown in (1) of Fig. 5.1. Then, as shown in (2), when the controller detects a violation
and triggers a security measure, the controller informs the Trusted Agent and updates flow
tables within the OpenFlow switch to redirect the client’s future traffic to the Trusted Agent.
In (3), the Trusted Agent accepts and stores the client’s keyID, passkey, MAC address, and
violation. Thus, for each of the cases mentioned above, the client is flagged and redirected
to a “walled garden” where our Trusted Agent presents the client with a web interface. This
interface provides the client notice of their violation along with instructions for gaining
compliance. For instance, if the client is flagged for patch compliance, then the Trusted
Agent can make the patch available for download (4a) and (5a). Then, once the software is
installed and validated, the client receives a passkey from a validation authority (5a or 5b)
which can subsequently be entered into the web portal. Upon entering a correct passkey
(6), the Trusted Agent communicates the revocation request to the controller (7), and the
client’s network privileges are reinstated (8).
Similarly, in cases where clients inadvertently (or overtly) violate network security poli-
cies (e.g., DoS, scanning, ARP poisoning, etc.) and get flagged by SDN security protocols,
then the Trusted Agent can provide client policy training to the client. The client would
then be required to complete and pass the course, digitally sign an Acceptable Use Policy
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(AUP), and cease such actions in the future. The passkey can also be provided with the
certificate of completion. Additionally, a network operator can choose what level of in-
volvement they wish to have in this process. For instance, they may want to take actions
based on a first occurrence, a third, etc. In a corporation or government office, the network
operator might require the first line supervisor to login and acknowledge the incident before
granting the certificate.
Another common case occurs when clients are flagged for a virus requiring their sys-
tem to be re-imaged. For such cases, a validation authority, such as a help desk can easily
provide this service or verify that specific actions were completed. A passkey can be pro-
vided once the action is confirmed. For all of these examples, the client regains network
privileges without involving the network operator.
5.3 Related Work
The goal of security management is to prevent local networks from being sabotaged (in-
tentionally or unintentionally) by controlling access to network resources in accordance
with organizational guidelines. This control is often implemented by systems that moni-
tor client logins and refuse access to those who fail to authenticate or lack authorization.
Accordingly, various methods for controlling network access exist in traditional networks
and SDNs. Traditional security management methods include access control lists (ACL),
client IDs and passwords, and terminal access controller access control (TACACS) [76].
These are indeed effective tools for enforcing prearranged policies on system networks.
However, these policies are often reconfigured by network operators each time a security
violation occurs or when a client (who triggered the security measure) regains approval to
be reinstated. Additionally, protocols like 802.1X [77] will shut down ports if they detect
unassigned devices connected to them, but reactivating these ports is often left to the net-
work operator to resolve via a trouble ticket. Hence, these solutions place considerable
configuration burdens on network operators, add additional software and hardware costs,
74
and lack an automated security policy transition framework for reinstating clients.
SDN solutions have also developed in recent years to assist network operators with se-
curity management. For instance, SNAC [78] provides network operators with a web-based
policy manager for network monitoring. It also includes a client interface and a flexible
policy definition language for device configuration and event monitoring. Even so, SNAC
does not provide an automated process for reinstating client privileges once lost. Another
solution assists network operators with migrating firewall ACLs from traditional networks
into an SDN [79]. The process evaluates policy rules automatically [79], [80]. Ethane [81],
a precursor to SDN, provides a centralized network architecture with identity-based ac-
cess control that allocates IP addresses as IP-MAC-port associations. In this environment,
clients authenticate via a web-form, and their packets are then reactively evaluated by the
controller for policy compliance. FlowNAC [82] drops web-based authentication in favor
of a modified 802.1X framework supporting extensible authentication protocol over LAN
(EAPoL-in-EAPoL) encapsulation. However, supplicant (client) software is necessary for
FlowNAC.
Kinetic, formerly known as Resonance, is a domain specific language (DSL) that offers
an OpenFlow-based dynamic access control system [2]. It uses network alerts to sup-
port continuous monitoring and per interface policy control to automate dynamic security
policies. Additionally, Kinetic verifies that prescribed changes align with operator require-
ments by employing a finite state machine (FSM) having states that correspond to distinct
forwarding behavior [2]. Transitions within the FSM are controlled by Kinetic’s event han-
dler, which monitors for events and triggers policy updates. However, Kinetic relies on the
network operator to supply the events that trigger its policy changes2. Also, since Kinetic is
built atop the Pyretic [16] programming language and POX [31], it is limited to OpenFlow
1.0 [12] and has access to only 12 packet header match fields. It also does not include an
automated framework for transitioning between security measures.
2The Pyretic runtime can also be utilized.
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These solutions all represent great strides towards better and more intuitive interfaces
that simplify the application development process, yet they still do not provide a frame-
work for automating the process for revoking security measures once implemented. Our
work is unique in its focus on security policy transitions within SDN environments, which
improves turnaround times for reinstating network clients while reducing network operator
workloads. Like Kinetic, our solution implements an event listener (aka Event Handler);
however, it works with a trusted entity (a.k.a. Trusted Agent) to determine when an acti-
vated security action should be revoked. Additionally, our controller assumes responsibility
for implementing security measures, but then relies on its Trusted Agent to provide notifi-
cation for when the measure can be revoked.
5.4 The Framework
The security policy transition framework introduced in this chapter uses Ryuretic [5] for its
SDN controller applications. Ryuretic [5] is a domain specific language offering a modular
framework for application development atop the Ryu [17] controller. It also provides an in-
tuitively simple format for network operators to select header fields within a packet (pkt[*])
and then specify what operation (ops[*]) occurs when a match (fields[*]) is found. This
platform also allows programmers to craft their own packets, which is utilized to establish
a communication channel between the SDN (Ryuretic) controller and its Trusted Agent us-
ing ICMP packets. This communication channel is then used to submit policy enforcement
updates or revocation requests. This is discussed in greater detail in Subsection 5.4.3. Ad-
ditionally, this communication allows both the Ryuretic controller and the Trusted Agent
to maintain corresponding state tables as we will also discuss in Subsection 5.4.3. These
and the other components comprising the controller and Trusted Agent modules (shown in
Fig. 5.2) are discussed in the following subsections.
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Figure 5.2: Security Policy Transition Framework Components [30]
5.4.1 Controller
As shown in Fig. 5.2, the Ryuretic controller for this framework is an SDN controller
comprised of an Event Handler, a Policy Enforcer, and a Policy Table. These components
are implemented in Ryuretic [5], which serves as an abstraction layer residing above the
Ryu [17] controller and supporting OpenFlow 1.3 [12]. With Ryuretic, network operators
can choose to forward, drop, mirror, redirect, modify, or craft packets based on match
parameters that they define via objects.
As shown in Fig. 5.3, when a packet-in event occurs in the Ryu [17] controller, the
Ryuretic Coupler generates a packet object (pkt) that is forwarded to the Ryuretic Interface.
This is where the network operator specifies their policies. Based on these policies, the
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Figure 5.3: Ryuretic Controller
network operator modifies two objects (i.e., fields and ops) to specify the match-action
rules that are to be performed on the switch. These objects are then interpreted by the
Ryuretic Coupler and forwarded as instructions to the Ryu controller, which installs the
rules to the switch.
Event Handler
The Event Handler serves as the primary interface for the controller, responding to network
events from the switch, security events from the Policy Enforcer, and security policy transi-
tions from the Trusted Agent. It also handles insert and delete messages for the controller’s
Policy Table to maintain state for each connected client. Once a client is flagged, the Event
Handler creates a unique passkey and a keyID for the client and enters this information
into the controller’s Policy Table along with the client’s MAC, input port, and violation.
When revocation messages arrive from the Trusted Agent with the appropriate keyID, the
Event Handler removes the associated client entry from the controller’s Policy Table, and
its security policy transitions to allow the client access to network privileges.
Policy Enforcer
The Policy Enforcer handles events passed to it from the Event Handler. It first confirms
that arriving packets are not already flagged in the Policy Table. If not, the Policy En-
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forcer next applies selected security policies against the arrived packet. If the packet passes
specified checks, then it is passed to the Event Handler for normal forwarding. Otherwise,
the Policy Enforcer returns fields and ops hash tables3 to the Event Handler resulting in
the client’s traffic being redirected to the network’s Trusted Agent. The Policy Enforcer
also generates the randomized passkey and a unique keyID, which is passed back to the
Event Handler with the client’s other unique flow information (i.e., input port, MAC, and
violation).
Policy Table
The Policy Table simply stores the identification and flag state information for each client.
As we will later see in Fig. 5.5, the Policy Table stores keyID (primary identification key),
passkey (for client authentication), MAC address, input port, and violation code for flagged
clients (of which, minus the input port, are forwarded to the Trusted Agent).
5.4.2 Trusted Agent
The Trusted Agent serves as an intermediary between the client and network operator.
For instance, the Trusted Agent is able to send revocation messages to the controller and
reinstate the client’s privileges in lieu of the network operator once the passkey is provided.
It can also provide clients with instructions for regaining network access. Its components
are shown in Fig. 5.2 and discussed next.
Client Policy Handler
The Client Policy Handler establishes a communication link with the controller to receive
policy activation notices and submit revocation requests. When the Trusted Agent is first
notified of a policy activation, it records the provided keyID, passkey, MAC, and violation
associations in its Client Table as indicated in Fig. 5.5. The Client Policy Handler also pe-
3Hash tables are Ryuretic’s method for directing network operations.
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riodically queries the Revocation Table for keyIDs belonging to clients who have submitted
a passkey and are awaiting the reinitialization of client privileges.
Client Table
The Client Table allows the Trusted Agent to maintain state for flagged clients. As shown
in Fig. 5.5, this table maintains the client’s keyID, passkey, MAC, and violation. It is also
queried by the Client Table Handler to confirm client MAC and passkey pairs. Furthermore,
the Client Table provides violation information to the Handler, so the Trusted Agent renders
appropriate instructions to the client.
Revocation Table
The Revocation Table allows the Trusted Agent to queue the keyIDs of clients awaiting the
reinstatement of their privileges. The Client Policy Handler then periodically queries the
table for keyIDs and sends them in revocation messages to the controller.
Client Table Handler
The Client Table Handler queries the Client Table to verify the client’s passkey and MAC
address. When successful, the Handler loads the client’s keyID to the Revocation Table
where it is queued for delivery to the controller. As a security measure, the Client Table
Handler can only query the Client Table and write to the Revocation Table.
Data Processor
The data processor is a Common Gateway Interface (CGI) module that provides server side
scripting for the Trusted Agent’s web server. It provides MAC and passkey associations to
the Client Table Handler, and it renders feedback information to the client’s web interface
via HTML.
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Figure 5.4: ICMP Packet Header
Web Server
While any number of web servers could be used for this component, this framework uses
the lighttpd [62] web server due to its small memory footprint and support for Common
Gateway Interface (CGI) scripts. The web server serves as the client’s primary interface
while resolving flags. It also captures the client’s MAC address via a PHP script4 when the
client enters their passkey. The passkey and MAC address are then forwarded to the Data
Processor for passkey validation.
5.4.3 Communication Channel
The SDN controller and Trusted Agent communicate with each other using ICMP to relay
rule insertions, updates, and revocations. However, while the Trusted Agent can receive
whole ICMP packets with complete payloads, the SDN controller only receives ICMP
packet header information. This places a significant limitation on the amount of data that
can be passed from the Trusted Agent to the controller. Consequently, the Trusted Agent
must overwrite the 8-byte data field of the ICMP packet header, which normally contains
the packet’s source IP and destination IP (see Fig. 5.4), with its messages.
With limited space, the Trusted Agent constrains it responses to action, keyID strings.
The action (see Table 5.1) value is a single letter abbreviation. It identifies the message type
(i.e., initialize, acknowledge, update, or delete) sent by the Trusted Agent. For messages
4The PHP script for obtaining client MAC addresses requires that clients reside on the same subnet as the
web server.
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Table 5.1: Abbreviations Used for Controller Communication [30]
Abbr. Meaning Summary
i initialize Establish Trusted Agent Parameters
a acknowledge Send table entry receipt for keyID
u update
Request update to refresh or replace current
client table
d delete Request policy deletion for specified keyID
that do not require a keyID, (e.g., initialize) the action value is simply followed by a zero.
For example, the Trusted Agent’s initialization message to the Ryuretic controller appears
as ‘i,0’. However, messages from the controller have more flexibility. For instance, rule
insertion methods destined for the Trusted Agent’s Client Table will include MAC, passkey,
violation, and keyID values. This format is recognized by the Trusted Agent and handled
appropriately by its Client Policy Handler. It is through this communication channel and
format that the Ryuretic controller and the Trusted agent are able to maintain corresponding
tables (the Policy Table for the Ryuretic controller and the Client Table for the Trusted
Agent), which are shown in Fig. 5.5. Moreover, while limited, this solution is easily
adaptable to other SDN controllers using existing protocols.
Figure 5.5: Controller - Trusted Agent Communication
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5.5 Test Environment
We tested our framework using Mininet [24], which is a network emulator that creates
virtual clients, switches, controllers, and links. All of our clients, including the Trusted
Agent are virtual machines with Ubuntu 14.04 operating systems. The switch is OpenFlow
1.3 [12] capable, and Ryuretic applications run atop a RYU controller to provide network
control. The testbed also provides Internet access via a virtual network address translator
(NAT). Until a client is flagged, it is able to ping other client and access web services via
the NAT device. Web services are tested using curl and wget commands and the Firefox
Internet browser. However, when a client is flagged, its data flows are redirected to our
Trusted Agent’s web server until the client provides the appropriate passkey. Once that is
provided, the client regains network privileges within 30 seconds of making the entry.
5.6 Example Use Case
To better demonstrate our security policy transition framework, we test our framework’s
ability to revoke a triggered security response for ARP spoofing. In doing so, we highlight
key code listings contributing to the framework’s detection and notification methods. We
also discuss the transition process for security measures.
5.6.1 Spoofed ARP Packets
Spoofed ARP packets can poison the ARP tables of neighboring clients on a subnet and
serve as a springboard for more dangerous attacks such as packet dropping (blackhole),
rogue web server, and man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks. Our framework allows the net-
work operator to set a policy in Ryuretic to detect and trigger security measures for such
attacks. When a packet arrives, Ryuretic determines its type and forwards it to the appro-
priate handler. For ARP, the packet is forwarded to the Event Handler’s ARP handler (see
Listing 5.1). The Event Handler first checks the incoming packet against its Policy Table.
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If flagged, then the controller drops or responds to the packet in accordance with its ARP
poison protocols. Due to space constraints, we do not include an example for this method5.
Listing 5.1: Ryuretic ARP Event Handler
1 d e f h a n d l e a r p ( s e l f , p k t ) :
2 p k t s t a t u s = s e l f . c h e c k n e t t b l ( p k t [ ‘ s rcmac ’ ] , p k t [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ] )
3 i f p k t s t a t u s i s ‘ f l a g g e d ’ :
4 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . Arp Po i son ( p k t )
5 e l s e :
6 s p o o f e d = s e l f . d e t e c t S p o o f ( p k t )
7 i f s p o o f e d :
8 s e l f . n o t i f y T A ( p k t )
9 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . drop ARP ( p k t )
10 e l s e :
11 f i e l d s , ops = s e l f . r e s p o n d t o a r p ( p k t )
12 s e l f . i n s t a l l f i e l d o p s ( pkt , f i e l d s , ops )
Listing 5.2: Ryuretic ARP Poison Detection Method
1 d e f d e t e c t S p o o f ( s e l f , p k t ) :
2 p o l i c y F l a g = F a l s e
3 i f s e l f . netView . h a s k e y ( p k t [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ] ) :
4 i f p k t [ ‘ s rcmac ’ ] ! = s e l f . netView [ p k t [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ] ] [ ‘ s rcmac ’ ] :
5 p o l i c y F l a g = True
6 i f p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] != s e l f . netView [ p k t [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ] ] [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] :
7 p o l i c y F l a g = True
8 e l s e :
9 s e l f . netView [ p k t [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ] ] = { ‘ srcmac ’ : p k t [ ‘ srcmac ’ ] ,
10 ‘ s r c i p ’ : p k t [ ‘ s r c i p ’ ] }
11 i f p o l i c y F l a g == True :
12 s e l f . ne t MacTbl [ p k t [ ‘ s rcmac ’ ] ] = { ‘ s t a t ’ : ‘ f l a g g e d ’ ,
13 ‘ p o r t ’ : p k t [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ]}
14 s e l f . n e t P o r t T b l [ p k t [ ‘ i n p o r t ’ ] ] = { ‘ s t a t ’ : ‘ f l a g g e d ’ }
15 r e t u r n p o l i c y F l a g
If the source MAC or input port is not flagged, then the packet is passed to the detect-
Spoof() method (see Listing 5.2). If the packet is flagged as spoofed, then the Event Handler
forwards a notification message to the Trusted Agent via ICMP. In turn, the Trusted Agent
adds the flagged client to its Client Table. The message contains (MAC, srcport, passkey,
violation, keyID) data values. Ryuretic’s fields and ops hash tables are then set to match
the packet and drop ARP replies from the sender. Otherwise, the packet is forwarded to the
respond to arp() method for normal forwarding. As seen in Listing 5.2, the detectSpoof()
5See https://github.com/Ryuretic/SecRev for complete implementation.
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method builds a network view that associates each client’s MAC and IP address to a switch
port. If a packet arrives after the network view is built with an incorrect MAC or IP address,
then it is flagged for spoofing. Its network flows are now forwarded to the Trusted Agent,
which renders a web page to inform the client of their violation and offer instructions for
regaining access to the network (e.g., submit a user agreement policy, UAP). Currently, our
system relies on the help desk to serve as the validating authority; however, future imple-
mentation could utilize patch software to provide compliance validation. Once the client
obtains and submits the passkey, the client is then reinstated on the network and able to
access its services–generally within 30 seconds of entering the passkey.
5.7 Discussion and Future Work
In future work, we hope to include additional fields in the Ryuretic programming frame-
work to accomplish more robust communication channels for security policy transition.
However, for the moment, our framework relies on current network protocols, while utiliz-
ing them in a disruptive way to reactively communicate the invocation and revocation of
security responses. Doing so, allows us to automate these actions without network operator
involvement.
While not demonstrated in this chapter, our work is also easily adaptable to a password-
based authentication framework for clients seeking to join the network. In which case, the
network view could be built as clients authenticate to the network. Likewise, with this
framework, there is potential to build a host of readily available actions that clients can
take once they are redirected to the Trusted Agent. For instance, the web portal can include
patches, courses, administrative documents, initial warnings, etc.
By pushing these responsibilities to the Trusted Agent, this framework alleviates many
day-to-day burdens experienced by network operators. Specifically, it eliminates the need
for network operators to provide the additional configurations needed to reinstate a client’s
privileges on the network. It also provides network clients with immediate feedback con-
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cerning their network privileges. Furthermore, this security framework is also applicable
to cloud and virtual network environments. Using network functions virtualization (NFV)
all components can be virtually created in a cloud infrastructure.
While SDN is capable of implementing numerous security features, this work does not
assume that all security features will be handled by the controller. In fact, the introduction
of our Trusted Agent further provides for the incorporation of additional security features
where secondary devices serve to provide more layers to a defense in depth security strategy
for detecting. Likewise, this work does not propose to replace application-level monitoring.
Such services are still needed to identify a client’s software version, provide patch compli-
ance, detect malware, or even application-layer firewalling. However, the Trusted Agent
could be configured to work with application-layer products in conjunction with amending
security within the controller.
Network operators must also consider that more clients than just subscribers will oper-
ate on their networks (e.g., M2M communication or Web service interaction). If not handed
appropriately, the redirection of flagged clients to a self-service interface, as proposed in
this work, could cause IoT devices or user agents to assume the network has failed. Ideally,
the network operator would whitelist or set aside specific ports for such devices to provide
notifications if the device becomes flagged. For such cases, the Trusted Agent could also
run a mail server to notify the help desk when a non-user device is affected.
5.8 Conclusion
With OpenFlow providing a vendor agnostic platform for SDNs and enabling the orches-
tration of numerous switches, programmers are better able to implement novel network ap-
plications for security and traffic engineering. Yet, network operators also need additional
measures for automating daily processes to fully utilize SDNs in physical and virtual en-
vironments. We present a security policy transition framework that automates the flagging
of clients, redirects their network flows to a Trusted Agent, and revokes activated security
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measures once the client validates their network compliance and enters a passkey obtained
from a validating authority (e.g., a help desk or patch software). This framework eliminates
many daily network configuration requirements that network operators must now perform
and improves the turnaround time for reinstating client access once compliance has been
obtained. Turnaround times vary by violation and validation procedure, but reinstatement
of network privileges occurs roughly 30 seconds after the correct passkey if entered.
5.9 Segue
This framework goes a long way towards reducing network involvement with network con-
figurations. However, the revocation of policy enforcements is not the only configurations
with which network operators need assistance. Many transition frameworks try to tie the
network operator directly into the decision making process for detecting and denying ma-
licious actors on their networks. Using this framework, the next chapter expands upon it
to offer a means for the Trusted Agent to work with the SDN controller to perform active
testing on clients. Within this process, clients move from flagged for testing, to deny or
allow, and if denied, back to allow once network operator requirements are met.
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CHAPTER 6
LEVERAGING SDN AND WEBRTC FOR ROGUE ACCESS POINT SECURITY
6.1 Introduction
Network security is a growing concern for government, industry, and campus networks,
and hackers continuously test the limits of the security tools available to network operators.
Rogue Access Points (RAPs), sometimes called malicious APs, such as wireless switches
and wireless routers, are no exception [83, 84]. Generally speaking, RAPs are unauthorized
wireless devices that, when connected to an organization’s network, provide unauthorized
wireless connectivity to other clients. While legitimate wireless access points (APs) give
authorized clients greater mobility, help to accommodate the shortage of IPv4 addresses,
and provide security or privacy for network clients, such devices can also allow hackers to
bypass firewalls and intrusion detection prevention systems (IDPS). Other clients may use
them to simply steal bandwidth.
Certainly, not all RAPs placed on a network are intentionally malicious. In some cases,
clients do so to make their network access more convenient. However, clients often fail to
enable even basic security features on these devices. As a result, hackers can access them
via default settings and configure these devices to facilitate their own efforts. Researchers
have also found that existing malware detection models are ill-equipped to deal with net-
work address translation (NAT) devices (or RAPs) and report that roughly 19% of infected
devices are hidden behind NATs [85]. For these reasons, we consider all RAPs to be a
threat to an organization’s network.
These devices also vary in functionality. Some RAPs act as simple switches, forward-
ing packets from various source addresses with no modification to the client packet’s IP or
MAC address. Throughout this chapter, such devices are referred to as wireless switches
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(WS). Other rogue access points implement NAT, and we refer to these as wireless routers
(WR) or wireless NATs. With wireless routers, one or many clients can reside on an un-
approved subnet that obfuscates their MAC and IP from the rest of the network behind the
RAP’s public facing IP. Previous research has already established such devices as one of
the most challenging problems facing network operators [86, 87, 88, 89].
While Ma et al. [90] identify four categories of RAPs (i.e., improperly configured AP,
unauthorized AP, phishing AP, and compromised AP), our work only seeks to mitigate
unauthorized APs by analyzing packets and traffic flows on the wire-side. As such, our
work makes no attempt to recognize phishing APs since they may not actually be con-
nected to the organization’s network. Likewise, our work does not consider improperly
configured or compromised APs since they are intentionally placed on the network by the
network operator and are either hacked or exploited due to improper configuration. Unau-
thorized APs, however, are RAPs that have been placed on the network without the network
operator’s permission or knowledge. Henceforth, we will commonly refer to both unautho-
rized wireless switches and unauthorized wireless routers as RAPs.
To detect these devices, our framework, which we refer to as Network Flow Guard
(NFG), offers a hybrid method, comprised of both passive and active measures, to detect
and deny RAPs access to a network. Fortunately, Network Flow Guard’s passive techniques
are already capable of detecting the majority of available RAPs. For those not immediately
detectable, Network Flow Guard passively monitors and analyzes client traffic signatures
for RAP behavior. Suspected RAPs are then flagged, and Network Flow Guard temporarily
redirects the suspected client’s traffic to its Trusted Agent for active testing. Clients who fail
the test are denied access to network services. Additionally, our active method introduces
minimal burden to the network and can be applied in a random or rotational manner to
periodically test all clients if preferred.
Beyond Network Flow Guard’s focus on SDN-based, RAP detection and denial, our
work also offers the following contributions:
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• Establishes an initial framework for detecting and blocking rogue devices connected
to SDN infrastructures
• Provides a public, open-source implementation of our work on GitHub [91]
• Provides a first use case for security emulation with Mininet-WiFi [25]
• Utilizes a combination of passive and active detection techniques to lessen the SDN
controller’s computation
• Uses the webRTC architecture to provide a novel NAT/RAP detection measure
• Improves features of Ryuretic [5, 91], a modular programming framework for SDN
application development
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 provides background information
concerning both NAT devices and RAPs. It also serves to motivate our reasoning for im-
plementing RAP security along the edge-devices of an SDN. Section 6.3 discusses the
current state of the art for detecting and preventing rogue devices (i.e., unauthorized NATs,
wireless routers, and wireless switches) from accessing network resources. In Section 6.4,
we discuss the assumptions and requirements for our design and the security features used
in our work. Section 6.5 then describes the architecture and components comprising the
Network Flow Guard architecture. We then discuss our test environment and test results in
Section 6.6. In Section 6.7, we offer further discussion on Network Flow Guard’s security
implementation and its viability towards RAP security. Next, in Section 6.8, we discuss
future work, and finally conclude in Section 6.9.
6.2 Background
Network security has emerged as a hot topic in industry, government, and campus organi-
zations. Additionally, due to the security threats that rogue devices can pose (e.g., DHCP
attacks, DoS attacks, data exfiltration, etc. [92]), Ma et al. [90] argue that detecting RAPs
is one of IT departments’ most important security functions. When physical port security is
compromised, RAPs allow adversaries to commit espionage and launch attacks from out-
side the organization’s perimeter. Moreover, it can be difficult to distinguish RAPs from
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other clients or approved devices (e.g., VM servers, WAPs, NAT devices, etc.) when they
also use a unique MAC-IP association.
6.2.1 Network Address Translation (NAT)
NAT devices act as an intermediary between private networks to other networks (e.g., the
Internet). Because of NAT, a single IP address can represent an entire network. This
feature has proven a valuable tool in overcoming shortages of IPv4 addresses. It also allows
network operators to partition their networks into smaller and more manageable networks
to hide network topology, provide client anonymity, and provide content filtering. However,
these devices introduce new vulnerabilities to networks as well.
Since it is possible to hide one or more networks behind a single IP address, clients
connected to these rogue devices can gain unrestricted access to the network. This threat
is particularly concerning with wireless NAT devices (e.g., wireless routers). Addition-
ally, while traffic generated by a NAT is an amalgamation of the traffic generated by its
connected clients, it can still be difficult to detect due to regular network traffic providing
concealment.
6.2.2 Rogue Access Points (RAP)
A RAP is essentially an unauthorized AP connected to a campus, industry, or government
network by unaware or malicious insiders. Unfortunately, multiple studies indicate that
nearly 20% of all corporations have active RAPs in their network at some time [92, 93, 94,
84]. And, as we have previously discussed, these devices may act as wireless switches or
wireless routers.
For such devices, Beyah et al. [95] identify two undesirable outcomes: 1) an employee
installs a RAP for convenience and a malicious user finds the unsecured connection via
wardriving; or 2) a hacker connects a RAP to a live port within an organization and uses
that device to run exploits from outside the organization’s security perimeter. These de-
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vices can include wireless routers, wireless (MAC-learning) switches, or modified clients.
Once installed, any number of exploits are available to the attacker, such as additional hack-
ing, sniffing wireless traffic, or performing man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks [84]. RAPs
can also pose a greater threat to local networks since they allow attackers to run exploits
from outside the security of the building’s network architecture. As a result, firewalls, port
blocking (e.g., 802.1x and NAC), anti-virus, WPA2 encryption or wire side scanners are
circumvented [92].
6.3 Rogue Device Detection Methods
Due to the potential threat RAPs pose, numerous studies in recent years have sought to
detect and prevent RAPs on traditional networks. Developed techniques include client-
side (wireless-side), server-side (wire-side), and hybrid approaches [93]. However, since
our solution only captures traffic via an OpenFlow-enabled switch, a server-side approach,
our work only touches upon client-side solutions and avoids discussion of hybrid solutions
altogether while addressing the server-side approaches most relevant to our work. For
completeness, Table 6.1 provides an overview of the many detection methods considered
in our research.
6.3.1 Client-side approach
Some client-side solutions use sensor-based wireless intrusion prevention systems (WIPS)
to identify, locate, and block RAPs. Aruba Networks, AirMagnet, and AirDefense repre-
sent a few vendors offering such devices. However, the equipment can be cost prohibitive,
may not cover all required areas, and may have legal implications. For instance, placing
WiFi units in rogue-AP blocking mode, instead of just detecting, can interfere with legiti-
mate signals (e.g., a phone or carrier hotspot signal) [122]. As a result, some technologies
for blocking RAPs have led to heavy fines by the FCC [122]. Likewise, security protocols
like WPA2 can prevent unauthorized devices from associating with a legitimate wireless
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Table 6.1: Server Side NAT Detection Techniques




U Yes U Passive Observe traffic leaving and entering the
network over time to detect patterns in
inter-packet spacing
Requires sniffer and




U Yes U Passive Observe traffic arrival times and create
signature for delay between packets
Requires sniffer and









Yes Yes No Passive Detects longer time intervals between two
consecutively sent packets, such as TCP
ACKs
Packets may be queued




Yes Yes No Passive Monitors the various lengths of TCP SYN
packets
Use of same OS
Multi-OS
[102]
Yes Yes No Passive Mapping TTLs to a port to detect multiple
OSes at that port
Multiple devices could
use the same OS (same
TTLs)
IP ID [105] Yes Yes No Passive Observes patterns in IP ID sequences to
detect multiple clients
Enabling Don’t Frag-
ment (DF) bit and ran-




Yes Yes No Passive Uses IP ID, TCP SEQ number, TCP SRC
port, TTL, window size, etc. to ID multi-
OS
Won’t detect OS like





No Yes No Passive Uses DCF and rate adaptation specifica-







Yes Yes No Passive Maps applications (e.g. Firefox) to port
using HTTP User-Agent data
Multiple devices could




Yes Yes No Passive Detects multiple MAC addresses on one
port
Devices can be bridged
with multiple IPs, but
share a single MAC
Device MAC Yes Yes No Passive Different vendors are known to use
unique values in MAC addresses
MAC addresses could
be spoofed





Yes Yes No Passive Monitors Cookies contained in payloads Processor intensive and
cookies can be disabled
HTTP logs
[110]
Yes Yes No Passive Uses that clients make HTTP requests–






Yes Yes No Passive NAT devices often associate high number





Yes Yes No Passive Uses clock skews created by computer
chips to ID devices





Yes Yes No Passive Monitors dst and src data for MAC, IP
and port. Uses machine learning tech-
niques (SVM, C4.5)









CSBBSW [88] Yes Yes U Passive Maintains running client-side bottleneck
BW to detect RAPs
Assumes more than one




Yes Yes No Passive Compares system boot time with TCP




NMAP [120] Yes Yes No Active Sends active packets to probe client ports Can alert hackers to de-
tection measures; addi-
tional traffic to network
Localization
[117, 121]
No Yes Yes Active WLAN localization algorithms can




RAP includes wireless routers and switches. ID field indicates if method distinguishes between NAT and RAP. U - Undetermined
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APs, but these security controls are only enforced by APs managed by network operators
[92]. They do little for rogue devices that connect directly to an Ethernet port. Additionally,
these rogue devices operate at a layer below anti-virus and intrusion detection prevention
systems (IDPS), rendering their protection ineffective [92]. Even with 802.1x port con-
trol, which most networks don’t have, RAP configurations are still difficult to completely
circumvent. For instance, a RAP could obtain network access through a bridging laptop
[92]. Other solutions, like having client devices monitor round-trip time (RTT) [111] or
received signal strength (RSS) and then report findings to a local server, require software to
be installed on client devices and may not be acceptable to bring your own device (BYOD)
initiatives.
Network operators may also use handheld wireless detectors [123, 124] requiring them
to physically search for RAPs. This is far from an ideal solution, since multiple frequencies
may be used and the area may be too large for an operator to quickly cover. Moreover,
as [125] observes, if savvy users employ directional antennas or other signal dampening
techniques, detecting these devices may not be possible. An additional fallacy of client-
side scanners is that they also falsely flag local hotspots, which can include smartphones,
wireless-enabled vehicles, neighboring business APs, and residential APs. However, while
there is still room to enhance client-side approaches to detect rogue devices, such efforts
are outside the scope of this work and not considered beyond this summary.
6.3.2 Server-side approach
Within server-side or wire-side solutions, three approaches contribute to our work’s overall
design to detect and deny RAP access to organizational networks. These include passive
detection, active detection, and SDN capabilities.
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Passive Detection
Passive approaches to detecting RAPs are often hard for attackers to detect, and they are
fairly easy to implement. The passive approach involves monitoring network traffic and
inferring outcomes based on those observations. Often the observation point is a port mirror
or LAN tap located somewhere in the network where the attacker’s traffic traverses. Various
methods use the time-to-live (TTL) field in the IPv4 header to detect NAT traffic [100,
101, 103, 104]. Maier et al. [104] also consider user-agent strings from HTTP requests
along with the TTL field of IP packet headers to passively identify NAT devices. Their
work observes that the initial TTL for Windows, MacOS, and Debian-based systems have
initial values of 128, 64, and 64, respectively. They also observe that NAT devices typically
decrement the TTL field before relaying a packet [102]. So, if a decrement is detected while
monitoring a switch’s port mirror, then the device is flagged as a NAT. They also implement
a method for flagging devices when multiple TTLs are found to originate from a single port
[104]. Unfortunately, problems with these methods include the need for middleboxes to
sniff traffic (which introduces financial, power, and space costs). Also, a lack of knowledge
regarding the monitoring port’s location in regard to the rogue device can make TTL values
difficult to intuit. [104] also use user-agent strings to detect RAPs; however, this method is
completely thwarted by HTTPS encryption and is not considered in our work.
Other solutions involve analyzing Ethernet headers for company MAC address assign-
ments [126]. Of course, if a rogue device behaves as a switch, then the detection of mul-
tiple MAC or IP addresses is also a strong indicator. However, Beyah et al. argue that
rogue devices with MAC address spoofing and NAT capabilities can easily circumvent cur-
rent detection methods [95]. Instead, they observe that temporal traffic characteristics (e.g.,
link speed, wireless link capacity, and traffic patterns), which are unique to wireless APs,
can be applied to correlate inter-packet space arrivals of FTP packets with RAPs. Their
method is able to detect RAPs with 90% accuracy and a false positive rate of 20%. How-
ever, their work, much like Maier et al., also struggles with placement of the monitoring
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port and switch load. For instance, inter-packet spacing methods can lose accuracy as more
switches are placed between the RAP and the monitoring device.
Wei et al. [96] implement two algorithms that perform sequential hypothesis tests to
evaluate the inter-ACK arrival times of TCP headers collected at a monitoring port. To
differentiate between wireless and wired connections, these algorithms exploit properties
inherent in 802.11 CSMA/CA and the half duplex nature of wireless channels. Kao et al.
[88] also use inter-packet arrival times to calculate the average bandwidth to detect wireless
clients. Their method offers an accuracy of 99%, and detected APs that are not whitelisted
are tagged as RAPs.
Gokcen et al. [102] look for patterns in network traffic to footprint NAT-like behaviors
and propose a passive machine learning approach using the C4.5 machine learning algo-
rithm. Using 41 classifying features available in NetMate, an open source flow generator
[127], they fingerprint NAT behavior. Yet, machine learning algorithms require training
and large datasets that may vary from one network to the next, thus limiting its portability.
Hence, our work avoids such approaches. Komárek [110] introduces a server-side solution
that is solely interested in detecting whether or not a given IP address found in proxy logs
is actually an end host. Komárek also assumes that a NAT device will be more active and
exhibit a mix of client behaviors when compared to single clients. However, a malicious
client may set up a wireless NAT for their sole use, so a mixture of behaviors would go
undetected. In contrast to the above approaches, Venkataraman et al. [109] make no as-
sumptions regarding whether wired networks are faster than wireless. Instead, they focus
on 802.11 MAC layer features, such as the Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) and




Since, many passive solutions are only capable of achieving detection rates of 85-97%, our
work also considers active techniques for rogue device detection. For instance, many RAPs
maintain open ports for HTTP requests, allowing clients to log into the system remotely
and configure the device. Other ports may allow SSH connectivity. If these ports are found
to be open by a scanner such as NMAP [128], then one might conclude that a RAP exists.
However, active detectors, like NMAP [128] can be slow, intrusive, and noisy when used
to scan indiscriminately. They also do not audit access points, and they can alert clients
that active scans are occurring by triggering personal firewall and IDS alerts [126]. Addi-
tionally, some RAP devices may be configured to only open ports when granting one of its
clients access to the network. Resultantly, NMAP results may not indicate the presence of
a RAP.
For the above reasons, our work avoids the active scanning approach and instead at-
tempts to detect wireless NATs using a technique we refer to as port intercepting. This
method essentially seeks to intercept a newly opened port’s traffic flow during a TCP com-
munication stand-up. Once intercepted, traffic flows are redirected to our Trusted Agent
where our active measures are deployed. However, since this feature represents one of the
contributions of our work, further discussion is postponed until Section 6.4.
SDN Approach
Software-defined networks (SDNs) separate the control plan from the data plane to allow
network operators to orchestrate network activities from a logically centralized controller.1
Accordingly, SDN is attracting noticeable attention, and both industry and academia are
now deploying SDNs. In addition, many researchers have already demonstrated that SDN
can be used to thwart ARP Poisoning [70, 34], DDOS [129, 130], Rogue DHCP servers
[131, 33], etc. without the use of excess equipment and on current network infrastructures.
1Controllers can still be physically distributed
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However, to our knowledge, no work has been published on detecting and preventing RAPs
from gaining access to SDNs. Hence, our work seeks to add to this growing body of
literature.
Fortunately, many of the passive techniques previously discussed are already fully im-
plementable by SDN, where OpenFlow-enabled2 switches serve as the network’s primary
detection device. This makes SDN a powerful detection mechanism, since OpenFlow
switches have unique access to state and header information located at the network’s edge.
For instance, the SDN switch is able to double as a monitor. Thus our work benefits from
a known monitoring point (the client’s point of entry). This monitoring also offers a new
level of control for the network. Furthermore, as mentioned previously, it represents a first
attempt at utilizing any of the previously mentioned detection methods in conjunction with
the dynamic capabilities of SDNs to detect and remove RAPs.
6.4 Network Flow Guard Security
In this section, we discuss the goals, design, and components for our Network Flow Guard3
security implementation. In doing so, we show how an OpenFlow switch, linked to a Ryu
[32] SDN controller, using Ryuretic [5], and working in cooperation with a Trusted Agent,
can serve as the primary intrusion detection/prevention system (IDPS) for an SDN.
6.4.1 Requirements and Assumptions
An essential requirement of our work is to distinguish rogue devices from legitimate wire-
less APs. However, since rogue devices can also include wired NAT devices that present
some of the same challenges as RAPs, we do not find it necessary to distinguish whether
the device is a NAT or a RAP in our work. Hence, identifying the presence and blocking
access of either device is considered acceptable in our work. Further, we seek to do so with
minimal impact to network performance.
2Other southbound interfaces exist; however, OpenFlow is still considered the defacto standard [42]
3Network Flow Guard (NFG) was first introduced in Chap. 2 and Chap. 3.
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Figure 6.1: Network Flow Guard’s RAP Detection Flowchart
Our work also makes some basic assumptions. For instance, we assume that multiple
MACs or IPs are visible through bridged devices, while wireless routers and NATs only
provide a single facing MAC and IP. We also assume that clients are directly connected
to an OpenFlow switch, and that legitimate wireless APs can be whitelisted. Additionally,
our work also considers the unique characteristics of operating systems, web browsers, and
network traffic (i.e., extra hop traffic characteristics created by a RAP insertion) along with
the number of MAC and IP addresses assigned to each port.
6.4.2 Security Features
Our solution employs several methods for detecting rogue devices. As shown in Fig. 6.1,
our algorithm initially passively inspect packets against a whitelist/blacklist table before
looking for TTL and multiple MACs transiting a single port. As it happens, these methods
alone can defeat the majority of rogue devices and, hence thwart novice attackers. In fact,
as shown in Table 6.2 where we provide the results of our observations for both wireless
routers (WR) and wireless switches (WS), we find that TTL decrement and multi-mac (or
multi-IP) detection are sufficient to detect all of the devices tested during our research,
with the exception of one scenario. Should a wireless switch have only one client, then
multiple MACs will not be detected and no TTL decrement will occur. However, our work
also considers other devices that implement a NAT but are configured to not decrement the
packet TTLs. For these, we implement a passive flagging scheme and an active detection
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Table 6.2: RAP Characteristics by Type
Wireless AP Type IP MAC NAT TTLDecr.
Multi
Mac/IP
CiscoLinksis E2000 WR Yes Yes Yes Yes No
ASUS RT-N56U WR Yes Yes Yes Yes No
NetGear N300 WR Yes Yes Yes Yes No
NetGear N600 WR Yes Yes Yes Yes No
Buffalo WZR-HP-G300NH WR Yes Yes Yes Yes No
ZyXEL WS No No No No Yes
TP-Link WS No No No No Yes
TrendNet TEW-430APB WS No No No No Yes
measure.
Consequently, since active methods for detecting RAPs add extra congestion to net-
works and are detectable by attackers, our work uses a hybrid approach as shown in Fig.
6.1. These passive detection methods identify RAPs using three algorithms: TTL check,
Multi-MAC/IP, and TCP time-to-ack analysis. Ports that are flagged for TTL decrement
or multi-MAC/IP are immediately denied access to network services, meaning all traffic
is either redirected to the Trusted Agent or dropped. On the other hand, ports flagged by
the time-to-ack (TTA) analyzer are redirected to Network Flow Guard’s Trusted Agent for
active detection. The Network Flow Guard architecture uses the following components.
Whitelist/Blacklist
Many NAT devices and wireless APs are intentionally used by network operators. To avoid
flagging approved devices or wasting valuable compute, Network Flow Guard exempts
whitelisted packets having the appropriate MAC-IP-port association. Of course, any de-
tected wireless AP or NAT not listed on the whitelist is flagged as a RAP. Network Flow




The time-to-live (TTL) checker serves as the next line of defense in the Network Flow
Guard framework and is completely handled by the SDN controller. When an IP packet
is detected, Network Flow Guard checks its TTL value in the packet’s IP header, which
should be either 64 or 128. If the TTL is ttlinit-1 or some other value, then the device
is flagged as a rogue device. Ports flagged by the TTL checker are immediately blocked
via the SDN controller’s ‘deny’ policy. To confirm this method’s effectiveness, we tested
several wireless routers (WR) and wireless switches (WS). The results4 are shown in Table
6.2. In all of the wireless routers we tested, we observe that TTL decrement does occur;
however, as discussed in Section 6.1, wireless switches simply forward packets without
modification. As a result, they go undetected by this method, since they do not decrement
the packet’s TTL. Further, we observe that some wireless routers (e.g., the NetGear N300)
only consistently decrement the TTLs of TCP[FIN, ACK], TCP[RST, ACK] and QUIC
packets. It also decrements the TTL of the first TCP[SYN] and TCP[ACK] packets. In
this case, we conclude that the wireless router is relying on its client to establish commu-
nication, but to improve performance, it handles the rest of the TCP communication until
it receives a TCP[FIN,ACK] or TCP[RST, ACK]. Even so, any decrementing makes this
wireless router detectable by Network Flow Guard.
Multi-MAC/IP Association
This algorithm simply maintains a running count of MAC and IP addresses associated with
each port of the switch. If the number of MAC addresses or IP addresses exceed one within
a given time span, we choose 60 seconds, then the single host assumption is violated. This
algorithm is primarily in place to catch RAPs that might bridge their clients through to the
network. This method works for the wireless switches (WS) shown in Table 6.2 with one
exception. Should the wireless switch only have one client, then this method fails to detect
4See https://github.com/Ryuretic/WiresharkCaptures for Wireshark captures.
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Figure 6.2: State Diagram for Capture of Port Flow TTA
its presence; however, for those that are detected via this method, they are automatically
added to the controllers’ ‘deny’ policy.
Time-to-Acknowledge (TTA) Analysis
One method of detecting RAPs includes monitoring the time it takes for a host to acknowl-
edge received communications. By tracking the round-trip time (RTT) of the three-way
handshakes of TCP connection establishments for individual IP addresses, [132] observe
that 100% of wired packets have an RTT of less than 1ms, while 80% of wireless packets
have an RTT exceeding 1ms. They also observe that they are able to successfully detect
wireless nodes with only 5% of RTT values. We adapt these findings to our own work;
however, since SDN allows the switch to serve as our monitor, we calculate the time-to-ack
(TTA) at each switch port rather than by IP address (which could be spoofed).
To do this, Network Flow Guard’s time-to-ack analysis module maintains a running
average for each switch port by capturing the time-to-ack (time between a destination IP’s
TCP[SYN,ACK] packet and the client’s TCP[ACK] packet) and adds it to the switch port’s
running average (portAv). Hence, Network Flow Guard must also maintain a state table
for the TCP connections of all client-connected switch ports. A state transition diagram
for a single time-to-ack capture is shown in Fig. 6.2. Here, the controller monitors for
TCP[SYN] packets originating from a client before initializing an entry in its state table.
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Once initiated, the controller monitors incoming TCP[SYN,ACK] packets destined for the
client’s corresponding IP and source port. When observed, it records a timestamp5 for the
packet’s arrival. Next, the controller monitors for the corresponding client’s TCP[ACK]
packet and records its timestamp. The difference between timestamps is recorded as a
time-to-ack. Network Flow Guard then removes the table entry for the TCP connection.
Once the time-to-ack is obtained, the value is entered into either Eqn. 6.1 or Eqn. 6.2
depending on whether the port average (portAv) is being initialized or not. Eqn. 6.1 cal-
culates an initial port average after the controller obtains its first time-to-ack. This value,
seeded with an initial value of 5ms (see Section 6.6), starts a running average. Eqn. 6.2
calculates subsequent port averages for the switch port. In both equations, either the seed
or the old portAv are weighted with a factor of 9 to ensure gradual changes (see Section
6.6).
portAvinit =




(weight ∗ portAvold) + TTA
(weight+ 1)
(6.2)
Since this method only requires the first three packets of a TCP handshake (i.e., TCP[SYN],
TCP[SYN,ACK], TCP[ACK]), Network Flow Guard shunts remaining packets from being
passed to the controller by installing a temporary Match-Action rule to the switch once the
TCP[ACK] is observed. This rule allows remaining packets to traverse the switch without
controller involvement until the flow completes. Moreover, eliminating the extra packet
load to the controller leaves additional compute available for other processing needs. Fi-
nally, the portAv for each port is compared with that of the other switch ports, and ports
having the highest averages are flagged for active testing.
5Ryuretic provides a timestamp for each packet object it creates.
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Figure 6.3: Port Interception on SDN Switch
Active Detection Engine
For Network Flow Guard, there are actually two options for utilizing the active detection
engine (ADE). In one case, the ADE is utilized anytime a port is flagged as a possible
NAT by time-to-ack analysis. In the other case, the ADE is used against all hosts on a
random, rotational basis. When a client is flagged (or selected), the controller dynami-
cally redirects HTTP(S) requests to Network Flow Guard’s Trusted Agent, which delivers a
PHP/JavaScript encoded index.php file to the suspected host and renders an HTML5 form
back to the Trusted Agent. If flagged by the ADE, then the controller updates its policy
table to ‘deny’ the client’s access to the network.
The technique Network Flow Guard uses to deliver its index.php file is one we refer to
as port intercepting. Since Network Flow Guard can only deliver its index.php file through
ports that are opened by the client’s browser, a new feature is added to the Ryuretic frame-
work (see Section 6.5) to allow the controller to intercept DNS and TCP traffic destined
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for one IP address and redirect it to Network Flow Guard’s Trusted Agent. This new fea-
ture further allows Network Flow Guard to modify packet header information as well. As
shown in Fig. 6.3, when Network Flow Guard’s policy table indicates that a client’s inport,
MAC, or IP is flagged for ‘deny’ or ‘test’, it redirects the client’s DNS and TCP traffic to
the Trusted Agent. To do so, the SDN controller maintains the flow’s intended destination
MAC, IP, and Port (for TCP only) under a unique keyID using the client’s srcip and srcport.
Hence, when the Trusted Agent responds, the controller completes a backwards lookup and
again reinserts the packet’s original values to complete the TCP or DNS communication
flow. As a result, the client sees the Trusted Agent’s DNS server and web server as its
intended destination. Moreover, with the client’s DNS and TCP being intercepted by the
controller and redirected to the Trusted Agent, Network Flow Guard is able to incorporate
its novel detection method.
Network Flow Guard’s active detection engine (ADE) takes advantage of an emerg-
ing application program interface (API) for real-time communication, webRTC, which is
now natively compatible with Google Chrome, Opera and Firefox web browsers [133, 134]
and having plugins for Internet Explorer and Safari. Moreover, more than one billion end-
points devices are already utilizing a webRTC-enabled browser [133]. WebRTC, which
is intended to provide real-time, low cost, high quality audio and video, and data com-
munication between network devices [133], can also be used to render a client’s local IP
address and ports via NAT traversal features enabled by its RTCPeerConnection API. The
RTCPeerConnection API is intended to allow two peers to communicate directly, browser
to browser [134]. Utilizing this API, Network Flow Guard’s Trusted Agent renders a PH-
P/JavaScript encoded index.php file to the client’s browser that seeks to identify subnets.
PHP, being a server-side programming language captures the client’s IP address as seen
by the Trusted Agent. However, the JavaScript language is a client-side programming lan-
guage, and it runs webRTC’s RTCPeerConnection API to initiate a hidden communication
with the client’s browser, which allows our method to obtain the client’s local IP address.
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Figure 6.4: NFG RAP Detection Framework
Both values are returned to the Trusted Agent via a hypertext markup language (HTML5)
post form method. Once received, the values are compared using a Common Gateway In-
terface (CGI) module (i.e. the Process Data module in Fig. 6.4) that provides server-side
scripting for the Trusted Agent’s web server. As of this work, we believe this to be the
first use of webRTC to actually detect the presence of subnets hiding behind NAT devices,
making it a disruptive and novel contribution to the body of literature for detecting RAPs.
6.5 Network Flow Guard Architecture
For this project, we use Ryuretic [5, 91], which is a domain specific language (DSL)
offering a modular framework for application development atop the Ryu [32] controller.
Ryuretic [5, 91] provides a means for network operators to rapidly prototype and exper-
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Figure 6.5: Controller - Trusted Agent State Information
imentally evaluate future routing or security applications for either wired or wireless en-
vironments. It also provides an intuitively simple format for network operators to select
header fields within a packet (pkt[*]) and then specify what operation (ops[*]) occurs when
a match (fields[*]) is found 6. We specifically developed this language for modular appli-
cation development on Ryu controllers using OpenFlow 1.3, which allows access to the
header fields like the TTL. Further explanation is provided in Section 6.7.
Another feature of this architecture comes from our earlier work [30] where we develop
a framework for handling security policy transitions within SDNs. In [30] work, ports
are not simply blocked, but referred to a Trusted Agent when the port’s attached client is
flagged for violating one of the network operator’s security policies. That framework is
further expanded in our work to support Network Flow Guard’s active detection measure.
In [30], we develop an ICMP-based communication (an in-band channel) protocol to send
information from the controller to its Trusted Agent, and vice versa. This communication
channel is used to submit security policy amendments; however, we expand this protocol
to communicate active test results in this work. Additionally, this communication allows
both the controller and the Trusted Agent to maintain corresponding state tables as shown
in Fig. 6.5. Next, we discuss the components comprising Network Flow Guard, as shown
in Fig. 6.4, in the following subsections.
6The * symbol is used to represent the respective key within the objects fields and ops.
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6.5.1 SDN Controller
While Network Flow Guard uses a Ryu [32] SDN controller supporting OpenFlow 1.3
[42], its applications are written in Ryuretic [91, 5]). These modules consist of the Event
Handler, Policy Enforcer, and Policy Table. These modules are next discussed.
Event Handler
The Event Handler serves as the primary interface for the controller, responding to network
events from the switch, security events from the Policy Enforcer, security policy transitions,
and test notifications from the Trusted Agent. It also handles insert and delete messages for
the controller’s Policy Table to maintain state for each connected client. Once a client is
flagged, the Event Handler creates a unique passkey and a keyID for the client and enters
this information into the controller’s Policy Table along with the client’s MAC, input port,
and flag as shown in Fig. 6.5. When revocation messages arrive from the Trusted Agent
with the appropriate keyID, the Event Handler removes the associated client entry from the
controller’s Policy Table (or updates the flag) and amends its security policy to allow (or
officially ‘deny’) the client’s access to network resources.
Policy Enforcer
The Policy Enforcer handles events passed to it from the Event Handler. It first confirms
that arriving packets are not already flagged in the Policy Table. If not, the Policy Enforcer
next applies selected security policies against the arrived packet. If the packet passes spec-
ified checks, then it is passed to the Event Handler for normal forwarding. Otherwise, the
Policy Enforcer returns fields and ops hash tables7 to the Event Handler resulting in the
client’s traffic being redirected to Network Flow Guard’s Trusted Agent. This also occurs if
a security policy flags the client for active testing. The Policy Enforcer also generates the
randomized passkey and a unique keyID, which is passed back to the Event Handler with
7Hash tables are Ryuretic’s method for directing network operations.
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the client’s other unique flow information (i.e., input port, MAC, and flag).
Policy Table
The Policy Table simply stores the identification and flag state information for each client.
As shown earlier in Fig. 6.5, the Policy Table stores keyID (primary identification key),
passkey (for client authentication), MAC address, input port, and flag for flagged clients
(all of which are forwarded to the Trusted Agent).
6.5.2 Trusted Agent
The Trusted Agent serves as an intermediary between the client and the network operator.
For instance, the Trusted Agent is able to send revocation messages to the controller and
reinstate the client’s privileges in lieu of the network operator once the passkey is provided.
It can also provide clients with instructions for regaining network access. Its components
are shown in Fig. 6.4 and discussed next. Additionally, as of this work, the Trusted Agent
also performs active testing on behalf of the controller, and notifies whether the client’s
status should be reinstated or denied based on test results.
Client Policy Handler
The Client Policy Handler establishes a communication link with the controller to receive
policy activation notices and submit revocation requests. When the Trusted Agent is first
notified of a policy activation, it records the provided keyID, passkey, MAC, and violation
associations in its Client Table as indicated in Fig. 6.4 and Fig. 6.5. The Client Policy
Handler also periodically queries the Revocation Table for keyIDs belonging to clients who
submit a passkey in order to regain client privileges. As of this work, the Client Policy
Handler also queries the RAP test table (see Section 6.5.2) for keyIDs and test results to
provide results back to the controller.
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Client Table
The Client Table allows the Trusted Agent to maintain state for flagged clients. As shown in
Fig. 6.5, this table maintains the client’s keyID, passkey, MAC, and flag. It is also queried
by the Client Table Handler to confirm client MAC and passkey pairs. Furthermore, the
Client Table provides violation information to the Handler, so the Trusted Agent renders
appropriate instructions to the client.
Revocation Table
The Revocation Table allows the Trusted Agent to queue the keyIDs of clients awaiting the
reinstatement of their privileges. The Client Policy Handler then periodically queries the
table for keyIDs and sends them in revocation messages to the controller.
RAP Test Table
The RAP Test Table allows the Trusted Agent to queue the keyIDs and test results of clients
currently under ‘test’. The results are a simple ‘pass’ or ‘fail’ value. The Client Policy
Handler then periodically queries the table for keyIDs and results and sends them in update
messages to the SDN controller.
Client Table Handler
The Client Table Handler queries the Client Table to verify the client’s passkey and MAC
address or the client’s active test data. When successful, the Client Table Handler loads
the client’s keyID to the Revocation Table (or the client’s keyID and result to the RAP Test
Table) where it is queued for delivery to the controller. As a security measure, the Client
Table Handler can only query the Client Table and write to the Revocation Table or RAP
Test Table.
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Table 6.3: Controller Communication Abbreviations
Abbr. Meaning Summary
i Initialize Establish Trusted Agent Parameters
a Acknowledge Send table entry receipt for keyID
d Delete Request policy deletion for specified keyID
r Result Send test result notice
Data and Passkey Processor
The data and passkey processor consists of two Common Gateway Interface modules that
provide server side scripting for the Trusted Agent’s web server. It provides MAC and
passkey associations to the Client Table Handler, and it also evaluates form data it receives
from the client’s browser to determine if the client is situated behind a NAT device. It then
renders feedback information to the client’s web interface via HTML.
DNS Server
The DNS server provides a response to DNS queries receives as a result of a client’s port
being intercepted. In this project, we use a Bind9 DNS server and configure it to render our
Trusted Agent’s IP address as the address for any DNS query it receives.
Web Server
The web server presents a web interface to clients and captures their MAC and IP addresses
via the index.php file8.
6.5.3 Communication Channel
The SDN controller communicates with the Trusted Agent using ICMP packets. Doing so
limits the Trusted Agent’s responses to what can be contained in the ICMP packet’s data
field, which allows for the insertion of an additional 64 bits (or eight characters) of data.
8The PHP script for obtaining client MAC addresses requires that clients reside on the same subnet as the
web server
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This choice makes our solution easily adaptable to other controllers. Hence, messages from
the Trusted Agent are action, keyID strings.
The action value is a single letter abbreviation as shown in Table 6.3 and identifies the
message type (i.e., initialize, acknowledge, update, or delete) sent by the Trusted Agent. For
messages that do not require a keyID, the action value is simply followed by a zero (e.g.,
“i,0”). However, messages from the controller may have additional data. For instance, rule
insertion methods destined for the Trusted Agent’s Client Table will include MAC, srcport,
passkey, violation, and keyID values. This format is recognized by the Trusted Agent and
handled appropriately.
6.6 Test Environment and Results
Our work takes advantage of a new Mininet-based [24] platform called Mininet-WiFi [25],
providing a first use case for wireless security application testing on the platform. Mininet-
WiFi capitalizes on Mininet’s containerized Linux kernel and adds both stations (i.e. wire-
less clients) and wireless APs by using cfg80211 to communicate with wireless device
drivers. It also uses the Linux 802.11 configuration API to provide communication be-
tween stations and mac80211.
The test environment for this implementation is shown in Fig. 6.6. With Mininet-WiFi,
the wireless clients are referred to as stations while wired clients are referred to as hosts.
In our test bed, there are six hosts and six stations. All six hosts are directly connected to
Figure 6.6: Mininet-WiFi Implementation and Testbed
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Figure 6.7: RTT from clients to gateway router
the switch, while three stations are connected to a wireless router (WR), and three other
stations are connected to a wireless switch (WS). One host doubles as our Trusted Agent.
Our work also utilizes the Ryuretic programming framework [91, 5] in conjunction with
a Ryu controller and an OpenFlow Switch as part of Network Flow Guard’s security im-
plementation. The Trusted Agent (TA) comprises the other part of Network Flow Guard’s
security implementation.
Before testing Network Flow Guards security applications, we first confirm that RTTs
for clients in our testbed align with results found in earlier work [132]. A total of 50 ICMP
echo requests are sent from each client. The recorded results are shown in Fig. 6.7. Results
for our testbed show that the wireless switches (WS) and wireless routers (WR) do, on
average, impose an additional propagation cost that is higher than that of wired clients.
Network Flow Guard also requires seed and weight values to maintain its rolling port
average for each port, as previously shown in Eqn. 6.1 and Eqn. 6.2. Using iperf, we
generate TCP traffic between each client and the gateway router (GW). The rolling port
average is recorded for each TCP connection. As shown in Fig. 6.8, wired clients maintain
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Figure 6.8: Rolling port averages at varying weights and seed of 5 msec
Figure 6.9: Rolling port average with weight of 9 and seed of 5 msec
a port average (or average time-to-ack) of roughly 5ms, which we choose as our seed
value for Eqn. 6.1. Weight values 3, 6, 9, and 12 are evaluated on ports 1 (WS), 2 (wired
host), and 9 (WR). The results for all weights are shown in Fig. 6.8, while results for our
chosen weight are shown in Fig. 6.9 across the same three ports. These ports connect
to the wireless switch (port 1), a wired client (port 2), and the wireless router (port 9).
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Accordingly, we note that the rolling port averages for these ports quickly diverge, allowing
Network Flow Guard to identify and flag the attached RAPs.
To test our Network Flow Guard security implementation, the following procedures
are followed. First, the Ryuretic controller is started. Next, the Mininet-WiFi network
topology is built. Then, using xterm [135], we open a terminal emulator for the Trusted
Agent. Afterwards, custom scripts are run to start the Trusted Agent’s DNS and web servers
along with its ICMP communication modules.
We first test our TTL decrement module by opening a terminal emulator in station 4
(sta4), which is connected to the wireless router (WR). We then attempt to perform a curl
request for a known web page. The controller immediately detects the TTL decrement
caused by the WR. As a result, Network Flow Guard sets the flag field in the Policy Table
to ‘deny’ and installs a new Match-Action rule to the switch to redirect traffic to its Trusted
Agent.
The multi-MAC/IP module is tested by opening a terminal emulator for both station 1
(sta1) and station 2 (sta2). A curl command is executed in sta1, which completes success-
fully. Then, we execute a curl command in sta2. The appearance of a second MAC or IP
(in this case, both) triggers a multi-MAC/IP violation, and Network Flow Guard sets the
flag field in the Policy Table to ‘deny’ and installs a new Match-Action rule to the switch to
redirect the client’s traffic to the Trusted Agent.
In order to test the time-to-ack analysis module, we first disable the TTL decrement
and multi-MAC/IP modules. Otherwise, either module will flag the RAPs before the test
completes. Two methods are used to test Network Flow Guard’s time-to-ack analysis mod-
ule. First, iperf, a general command-line utility for testing the speed of TCP connections,
is used to evaluate Network Flow Guard’s time-to-ack analysis module. For each client
(host and station), the iperf utility is run twelve times. The destination address for these
devices is the network’s gateway router (connected to port 8). As shown in Fig. 6.10, the
ports connected to the wireless router (port 9) and the wireless switch (port 1) yield higher
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time-to-ack values than the ports connected to wired clients. Repeated experiments yield
comparable results.
Next, to better tax the system, a script is simultaneously run on all clients (host and
stations) in the network, causing each client to make repeated curl request to one of two
common web sites every three seconds. In total, each client makes 24 curl requests, and
their port average (portAv) values are evaluated. The results are shown in Fig. 6.11. As with
Figure 6.10: TTA analysis of iperf results per port
Figure 6.11: TTA analysis of curl script results per port
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the iperf test, port averages for both the wireless switch and the wireless router are greater
than those of the connected hosts. Additionally, the difference is much more pronounced
as wireless clients must compete for access to a single port. The rolling port average is also
shown for each port in Fig. 6.12. While port 1 (connected to the WS) shows an immediate
deviation from other ports, port 9 (connected to the wireless router) takes several more
iterations to become comparably distinguishable. Accordingly, Network Flow Guard first
flags the wireless switch and then the wireless router for active detection.
To test our Active Detection Engine (ADE), we intentionally flag the port connected to
our wireless router for ‘test’ within the Policy Table. This too sets a Match-Action rule to
the switch that temporarily redirects traffic from port 9 to Network Flow Guard’s Trusted
Agent. A terminal emulator is opened for station 4 (sta4) and Firefox is used to open
a web page. Monitoring traffic for both the wireless router and the Trusted Agent with
Wireshark reveals that sta4’s browser submits a DNS request that is intercepted and passed
to the Trusted Agent. The Trusted Agent provides a DNS response. The browser then
establishes a TCP connection with Network Flow Guard’s Trusted Agent, and an index.php
file is delivered to the browser. For the purpose of this experiment, the index.php file is
Figure 6.12: Rolling average analysis of curl script results per port
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Figure 6.13: WebRTC Results (Firefox Web Browser)
modified to display the client’s local IP address, as seen by the Trusted Agent and the
client’s browser along with a submit button. Normally, this is all hidden from the client
and the form submission is automatic. As shown in Fig. 6.13 for sta4, two different IP
addresses are displayed. Once submitted, the Common Gateway Interface script identifies
the mismatch and sets the keyID in the RAP test file to ‘fail’. The Trusted Agent then sends
the results to the SDN controller, and Network Flow Guard sets the flag field in the Policy
Table to ‘deny’. Future attempts by sta4 to access network services yields the Trusted
Agent’s passkey page. Once the client addresses the issues causing its flag, a passkey is
provided via help desk. Entering the passkey allows the client to regain their privileges.
As discussed earlier, webRTC is not yet compatible with all browsers (e.g., Internet Ex-
plorer, Safari, etc.). When Network Flow Guard attempts an active test on these browsers,
it receives a pre-set value: ‘test’. This notifies Network Flow Guard that an incompatible
browser was used. No action is taken against the client.
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Figure 6.14: Server BW comparison of Ryu vs Ryuretic
Figure 6.15: Client BW comparison of Ryu vs Ryuretic
We evaluate Network Flow Guard’s performance cost against a Ryu controller, imple-
menting a simple, MAC-learning, switch, which permanently installs Match-Action rules
to the switch as each device connects to the network. Hence, once rules are installed, the
switch handles all forwarding. However, SDN security applications must process extra
packets at a cost to performance. To determine this cost, we utilize iperf to conduct band-
width tests for each port seven times. Fortunately, Network Flow Guard imposes minimal
impact to the network’s performance. As shown in Fig. 6.14, the performance cost to flows
from the server is 8.7%, while client cost, as shown in Fig. 6.15, is negligible.
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6.7 Discussion
Our work offers a solution for detecting RAPs that incorporates the emerging webRTC API
and other traditional approaches into the dynamic capabilities of an SDN. To our knowl-
edge, this work represents a first attempt to utilize an SDN to detect RAPs. Likewise,
it uses the webRTC API in a disruptive way to detect hidden subnets. Additionally, our
per flow approach to passive RAP detection reduces the total compute of our controller
by evaluating just three packets of a TCP handshake (i.e., TCP[SYN], TCP[SYN,ACK],
and TCP[ACK]) before installing temporary Match-Action rules to the switch, allowing
the TCP flow to complete without additional controller involvement. Moreover, our active
detection measures are able to detect NAT devices without evaluating HTTP(S) strings and
raising privacy concerns. Instead, HTTP GET requests are sent to Network Flow Guard’s
Trusted Agent, which delivers our custom scripts to the client’s browser via an index.php
file. Once the client’s browser verifies its local IP address, the SDN controller then directs
future packets to their appropriate destination.
Another benefit of Network Flow Guard’s use of SDN is a centralized monitoring point.
One issue that Yasemin et al. [102] identify in their work is that the number of hops
between the machine observing traffic and the device generating the analyzed traffic may
not be known. For SDN, however, there is a centralized monitoring point since the client
plugs directly into the switch responsible for capturing traffic for analysis. As a result, the
TTL should arrive at the switch unaltered. Of course this does require that NATs play fair.
For instance, if TTL decrement is disabled (allowed by Juniper routers, etc.), then TTL
detection measures can be evaded. However, we believe that, while TTL decrementing
can be circumvented, detecting it should still be part of any NAT detection scheme, and
Network Flow Guard includes this capability.
While tracking the time-to-ack from clients was affective for identifying potential RAPs
in our test environment, we note that our initial seed value of 5ms may have to be adjusted
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for other networks. Still, the time-to-ack analysis module is only intended to flag potential
RAPs for testing, so clients are not denied access to the network because of this feature.
Additionally, we are not able to duplicate the scenario where the RAP sends TCP[ACK]
messages to the destination on behalf of its client. For these packets, their time-to-ack
would be equivalent to other hosts on the network. Yet, as we observe from our Wireshark
captures (discussed in Section 6.4.2), the packets comprising the three-way handshake of
its TCP connections are handled by the client, so even this device will be flagged for ‘test’
by our time-to-ack analysis module. Better yet, the presence of a decremented TTL field
also means that it will be flagged for ‘deny’ upon transmission of its first IP packet.
Still, our method does not protect clients from connecting to RAPs. Instead, it blocks
RAPs at the port, which is an approach taken for NAT devices as well. Additionally, while
it is possible that IPv6 could address many of the short comings that make NAT devices
necessary, for the moment, it appears that backwards compatibility with existing protocols
(i.e., IPv4) is preventing IPv6 from gaining significant traction in network operations. Con-
sequently, RAPs also function within IPv6 architectures, so methods for detecting them are
still needed.
Another point worth mentioning is that Ryu [32] was not our original choice for this
implementation. We originally intended to use POX [31] in conjunction with Pyretic [16].
This modular programming language is very intuitive for users and greatly simplifies ap-
plication development for SDNs. Unfortunately, Pyretic’s dependence on POX, which is
only compatible with OpenFlow version 1.0, did not allow us access to the TTL field in
IPv4 headers. Hence, to further pursue our work, we turned to Ryu, which supports Open-
Flow versions 1.0-1.5. However, Ryu lacks the abstractions available in Pyretic, which
made modular application development much more complicated. This inspired our earlier
work to create the Ryuretic framework for modular application development [5, 91]. How-
ever, an additional feature was needed in the Ryuretic framework to simplify the process
of dynamically redirecting and modifying packet header fields at the switch. That feature
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is added in this work, and the updated Ryuretic platform can be found at [91].
Mininet-WiFi [25] was also not our original choice for our test environment; yet, its
discovery proved particularly timely for this research. Many researchers use Mininet [24]
to setup their testbeds, and it is a useful tool for testing security applications for a wired
network. However, it offers few features for emulating wireless devices (e.g., wireless
switches, wireless routers, and stations) on SDNs. Without Mininet-WiFi, we would have
been relegated to setting up our testbed in an ns-3 [136] topology or OpenNet [137]. And,
while ns-3 is an excellent resource, it introduces another platform that researchers may not
be familiar with, and it lacks the ability to stand-up multiple clients simultaneously or em-
ulate various servers. OpenNet [137] was the emulation platform we originally considered.
It represents a recent attempt at modeling wireless devices and serves as a software-defined
wireless LAN (SDWLAN) simulator. OpenNet implements taps between Mininet nodes
and wireless ns-3 APs that simulate wireless features. Unfortunately, the drawback to this
platform is that no clear procedure exists for adjusting link parameters, such as packet
loss, delay, and channel bandwidth without modifying OpenNet’s source files. Fortunately,
Mininet-WiFi does include these features and a means to manipulate interference, data loss,
delay, and other features within the Mininet-WiFi topology file.
6.8 Future Work
While this research implements a viable solution for detecting and preventing RAPs on
SDNs, there is still more that can be done. For instance, this framework, introduces the
concept of a Trusted Agent, which serves as part of Network Flow Guard’s Active Detec-
tion Engine (ADE) while also automating the process for clients to regain network privi-
leges. Yet, the Trusted Agent could potentially perform many other yet unrecognized tasks.
Additionally, detecting and denying a RAP when a single client is connected to a wireless
switch remains an open challenge in our work.
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6.9 Conclusion
We consider the capabilities of traditional networks to defend against rogue access points
(RAPs), and then offer a first-ever, SDN-based approach to detecting and preventing RAPs.
An emerging architecture, webRTC, is also exploited as a novel method for detecting sub-
nets hidden behind NAT devices. Hence, our work contributes a new RAP detection method
that is applicable to both SDNs and traditional networks. Other contributions of our work
includes its use case for the newly developed wireless network emulation framework (i.e.,
Mininet-WiFi) and its introduction of a new feature enabling Ryuretic (a modular program-
ming language for SDN application development) to simultaneously redirect packets and
modify their header fields. Using Mininet-WiFi, we implement a testbed capable of sup-
porting wireless switches, wireless routers, and wireless hosts (stations). In doing so, our
work further validates Mininet-WiFi’s viability towards wireless security application devel-
opment and testing. Additionally, our work adds a new operation feature (i.e., modify) to
the Ryuretic programming language to enable port intercepting as a means to perform ac-
tive testing on suspected clients. All of these contributions work together to demonstrate a
hybrid testing methodology consisting of passive and active techniques for detecting RAPs
connected to an organization’s network with a performance cost of less than 9%. All files





Ryuretic offers comparable performance overhead to other programming frameworks. For
instance, in Chap. 6, we observe that the performance overhead of Network Flow Guard
while monitoring TCP traffic for rogue access point indicators (i.e., observing time-to-ack
values) on an Open vSwitch is roughly 9%. This value is comparable to the performance
of another SDN-based framework known as FRESCO [138, 139]. Using a Nexus 5 and a
Nexus 7 for their FRESCO security monitoring applications, Hong et. al reported perfor-
mance overheads of 9% and 7% respectively.
Ryuretic also offers programmers significant abstractions and less coding to achieve
comparable results to Ryu-based programs. For instance, when building a stateful firewall,
as seen in Fig. 7.1, Ryuretic requires far less lines of code (80% less than its closest rival)
Figure 7.1: Code comparison of Ryuretic and Ryu based Stateful Firewalls
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Figure 7.2: Code comparison of Ryuretic and POX and based Stateful Firewalls
to implement its stateful firewall. We also observe that Ryuretic requires no decorator
statements and only 13%-16% of the import statements. Likewise, Ryuretic requires less
methods to be created. Moreover, the variables that must be declared and set in Ryuretic
are far fewer (80%-94%) than those in the Ryu programs. This is because the Ryuretic
coupler or backend already handles the decorators, imports, variables, and methods needed
to create an application atop the Ryu controller.
Similar observations are also seen when Ryuretic is compared with POX and Pyretic
programs (see Fig. 7.2). While decorators can be abstracted from POX and Pyretic pro-
grams, these programs still contain significantly more lines of code, imports, unique meth-
ods, and set variables compared to a Ryuretic program. For instance, Pyretic requires nearly
five times more lines of code to implement a comparable ARP spoof detection method,
while POX requires eight times more lines than Ryuretic. Similarly, Ryuretic uses three to
five times less imports and four to ten times less definitions. Ryuretic also uses significantly
less variables, ranging from a factor of three to seven.
In RYU and the other programming examples, the programmer is responsible for every
line of code; however, Ryuretic provides a framework that allow programmers to simply
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focus on inserting lines of code for interacting with a packet (pkt) object and returning
match:action decisions in the form of fields and ops objects. This object based program-
ming framework allows network operators to focus on the specific task they hope to achieve
rather than the inner-workings of an underlying controller.
7.2 Discussion
Throughout this dissertation, we highlight how software-defined networking (SDN) [10]
allows for a single controller to orchestrate the actions of an entire network of switches1.
Meanwhile, southbound interfaces, such as OpenFlow [12], provide network operators with
a single, vendor-agnostic interface for creating network applications, allowing for more
fine-grained orchestration. In addition, these interfaces are further augmented by program-
ming frameworks, like Pyretic [16] and Ryuretic [5] to provide greater abstraction and
shield network operators from the complexities inherent in network application develop-
ment. With these abstractions, network operators are able to focus more on the applications
they want to implement, and less on the inner workings of the network. Furthermore, as
organizations seek to protect their clients, data, and network resources, researchers and net-
work operators are looking towards SDN’s capabilities to quickly produce network security
applications that address various attack vectors as they are discovered.
With regard to network security, many researchers [140] already believe that SDN may
very well prove to be one of the most impactful technologies for driving a variety of in-
novations. Consequently, SDN has already been leveraged to thwart DDoS attacks [141,
129, 142], provide dynamic access control [143], add security monitoring as a service
[144], provide security for BYOD initiatives [139], and check for potential violations of
key network invariants [145]. Likewise, industry is deploying SDN to strengthen network
architectures and improve performance and utilization [146], reduce operational cost [147],
and enable the rapid creation of new network applications and functions [148]. Other bene-
1This dissertation only considers a single controller, though distributed, logically centralized controllers
can be used for more robust control options (e.g., fault tolerance, scalability, and etc.).
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fits of this paradigm include greater vendor neutrality, reduced middlebox dependence, and
less network operator involvement with day-to-day configurations.
Accordingly, this work takes advantage of observations by Shin et al. [140] that indi-
cate how SDN can clearly enhance network security functions in specific ways. First, the
ability to dynamically control network flows allows greater flexibility in security applica-
tion deployments without the need for additional middleboxes. Second, its centralized view
of the network creates great opportunities for network-wide security monitoring. Likewise,
this ability allows SDN security functions to more quickly and efficiently comprehend net-
work attacks (even those that are widely distributed in the Internet) than do legacy network
security monitoring systems [140]. Third, SDN can be leveraged for the rapid prototyping
of new and advanced network security features without adding extreme cost or effort.
This ability to rapidly prototype solutions serves as a key enabler for our own research.
In doing so, we systematically develop a platform for simplifying application development,
automating the updates of policy enforcements in accordance with specified security poli-
cies, and allowing for the incorporation of active testing measures within an SDN-based,
security/management framework. Initially, the solutions implemented in this dissertation
focus on detecting and denying violations of network policies. Many other security solu-
tions, as revealed in our research, adapt this approach as well. However, such solutions
merely detect and block clients who violate specified policies. They give little consider-
ation to the additional work that these solutions impose on network operators who must
manually reconfigure policy enforcements once they are triggered.
To avoid network operator involvement, some researchers have developed solutions that
force the SDN controller to supplant network protocols, such as DHCP and ARP. In one
case [41], the SDN controller handles all DHCP requests within a virtual environment in
order to deny rogue DHCP servers access to the DHCP-requests of other clients. Similarly,
Kang et al. [71] leverage an SDN controller to capture all MAC addresses as virtual devices
are created in a cloud and then respond to ARP requests itself in order to cut down on
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ARP traffic in the network. In other cases, researchers simply stop at the detection of a
security violation–leaving it to the network operator to investigate further and implement
configurations as required. In some other cases, researchers allow policy enforcements to
timeout without any verification that the cause of the original violation was addressed [138,
140].
This dissertation began with similar efforts, which allowed us to demonstrate that it is
possible to implement security solutions that do not require the controller to monitor for and
respond to every packet. Instead, our solutions enhance existing protocols by monitoring
packets and acting when a policy violation occurs. Hence, our earlier solutions from Chap.
2 and Chap. 3 demonstrate that it is relatively simple to incorporate SDN security solutions
that facilitate both static and dynamic configurations simultaneously. Moreover, both of
these solutions are applicable to both physical and virtual network infrastructures.
However, by not incorporating a means to dynamically update policy enforcements in
an automated manner, these solutions also create additional work for network operators.
Not only must they investigate the reason for a client being denied access to network ser-
vices, they must also perform manual configurations to reinstate the client once the client
gains approval to rejoin the network. Or, they must investigate a flagged client and man-
ually transition them to a state of ‘deny’ or ‘allow’ based on further investigation. But,
doing so increases the possibility of a network operator causing additional network errors,
a temporary loss of orchestration, and/or a partial or permanent loss of network state. None
of these outcomes are desirable. Upon completion of these security applications, we also
reached a limit of what we could accomplish with Pyretic [16] and the OpenFlow 1.0 [12]
southbound interface.
The security features we next sought to implement required access to additional packet
header fields (i.e., time-to-live) and a means to support active testing and policy enforce-
ment transitions. Unfortunately, these are requirements that Pyretic and POX simply cannot
support. What’s more, these desired security features also require communication chan-
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nels, which are also unavailable with Pyretic and POX. These limitations led us to develop
the Ryuretic [5] programming framework for Ryu. Ryuretic allows network operators to
provide object-based instructions that allow their applications to match on specific packet
header fields (having over 40 options) and then assign a variety of actions to individual
flows, which include forward, drop, redirect, mirror, and modify (simultaneously changes
packet header fields and redirects network flows). Consequently, beyond accessing addi-
tional packet header fields, the Ryuretic programming language also offers programmers
the ability to craft packets. Furthermore, Ryuretic also allows network operators to setup
proactive and reactive policies that target specific layers of the OSI model within their net-
works. These features make Ryuretic a key enabler for our transition framework introduced
in Chap. 5 and for our active testing features introduced in Chap. 6.
It is in Chap. 5 of this dissertation that we finally address the need for an automated se-
curity policy transition framework for network operators. Chap. 5 also introduces a Trusted
Agent and a limited ICMP-based communication channel. The Trusted Agent essentially
serves to validate that a client has met network policy requirements before sending a policy
enforcement revocation request to the SDN controller to reinstate the client’s privileges.
As we discussed in Chap. 5, this work frees network operators from daily reconfiguration
requirements, which are caused by client policy violations, by allowing the Trusted Agent,
or a less-skilled help desk attendee, to work with the client and address the violation in
order to obtain a passkey.
In Chap. 6, we further enhance the transition framework and Ryuretic to support policy
enforcement state changes. Those being ‘test’, ‘allow’, and ‘deny’. Unlike other research
where the network operator is called upon to make decisions about flagged clients, this
chapter utilizes the Trusted Agent to transition a client from a state of ‘test’ to a state of
‘allow’ or ‘deny’. In Chap. 6, a solution that uses a port interception technique made pos-
sible by Ryuretic’s modify (mod) operation is used to redirect the client’s HTTP requests
to the Trusted Agent. The Trusted Agent, in turn, delivers a PHP/JavaScript file to the
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client’s browser, which exploits the webRTC architecture to determine whether the client
is residing on a hidden subnet.
Additionally, within the context of this work, clients are considered to be untrustworthy.
As a result, none of the solutions implemented in this dissertation require client systems
to participate beyond interacting with our Trusted Agent to regain network privileges once
they are lost. Hence, network operators do not need to worry with maintaining client-side
software to utilize any of the security solutions presented in this work–the one exception
being that our webRTC solution requires a Chrome, Opera, or Firefox browser be used
when detecting hidden subnets. However, this is software that many clients (over 1 billion)
already use on their own systems, and we expect more browsers to soon enable the webRTC
architecture as well.
Finally, while we believe that this work offers significant contributions to network secu-
rity, potentially reduces the number of middleboxes required on a network, and eliminates
a significant number of network operator configuration requirements, the Network Flow
Guard framework is not an end all solution. In truth, its security solutions are only in-
tended as an initial barrier or a first defense in a defense-in-depth strategy. As such, it has
little application for security within the higher echelons of network infrastructure. At least,
those applications are not considered in this work. Moreover, network operators must still
carefully evaluate their policies to avoid policy conflicts.
7.3 Contributions
This work originally set out to determine whether it is possible and then how to leverage
the capabilities of SDN, aided by NFV, to enhance network security. In doing so, we first
demonstrate that SDN security features can indeed be rapidly developed to address tradi-
tional security challenges in both static and dynamic network environments. This work also
offers a programming framework allowing network operators to match on over 40 packet
header fields and then choose such options as forward, drop, redirect, mirror, modify, or
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craft packets. Besides enabling fine-grained and targeted application development, this
framework makes possible an ICMP-based communication channel and a port interception
method. Doing so allows this work to introduce a Trusted Agent and alleviate network
operator troubleshooting and network configuration requirements by handling client vali-
dations and automating the revocation or updating of policy enforcements with the SDN
controller. Finally, this work augments the Trusted Agent to not only revoke policy en-
forcements, but to guide state transitions from ‘test’ to ‘allow’ or ‘deny’. This allows for
the creation of a security system deploying both passive and active testing methods and ca-
pable of both automatically removing client access from network services and reconnecting
those services when the client addresses the violation. Additionally, a new Mininet-based
emulation environment, Mininet-WiFi, is utilized and validated as a legitimate platform for
testing wireless security applications. Furthermore, this work introduces a novel feature for
NAT detection using the webRTC architecture to detect hidden subnets.
7.4 Future Work
In concluding this dissertation, we summarize some potential and interesting research di-
rections that this work could support. Possible directions include enhancing the Trusted
Agent with machine learning algorithms, incorporating an east-west bound interface in the
Ryuretic framework to enable cross-domain policy enforcement or verification, detecting
and resolving network policy conflicts, and expanding the Trusted Agent to take on more
responsibilities and implement additional security features.
For instance, machine learning approaches to handling client interactions by the Trusted
Agent would allow our Trusted Agent to behave in a much more robust manner. Goals
of such research would be to enhance the user interface presented by the Trusted Agent
to provide a more human interaction and better decision making capabilities. Likewise,
machine learning could enhance the Trusted Agent to better coordinate policy agreements
and validate them across multiple domains.
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The incorporation of an east-west bound interface would also serve to support multi-
domain policy enforcement amongst multiple SDN controllers. Likewise, it would allow
for more robust communication between Network Flow Guard’s Trusted Agent and the
SDN controller. Currently, the communication channel offered by Network Flow Guard’s
transition system is 64 bytes, allowing for eight characters. With a better in-band com-
munication protocol, Trusted Agent to SDN controller communication and SDN controller
to SDN controller communication can be much more robust, possibly supporting encryp-
tion. Already, we are looking at modifying Ryuretic to work with OpenFlow switches that
support the REST API. However, the inclusion of the REST API is only in its nascent
stages. It is possible that the OpenFlow protocol could be further extended to allow for
SDN communication messages for the controller as well.
As mentioned previously, the Network Flow Guard platform does not yet include a
policy conflict detection/prevention mechanism. As a result, multiple applications could
potentially circumvent the policies introduced by other applications. Currently, it is left
to the network operator to choose a priority for these rules, but in cases where priorities
are equal, there is no resolution protocol for handling such issues. Hence, Network Flow
Guard could benefit from services that check for potential violations using similar methods
as Veriflow [145].
Finally, with the inclusion of a Trusted Agent and the ability to perform active testing,
future work can also include more robust network security and management measures. The
Trusted Agent could potentially coordinate its efforts with other middleboxes on the net-
work or include its own measures for augmenting the passive detection algorithms utilized
by the SDN controller. It is also possible that the Trusted Agent could take a more active
role in validating network paths before allowing the SDN controller to modify traffic flows.
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7.5 Conclusion
In this dissertation, we introduce the capabilities of SDN and NFV, and systematically in-
vestigate their application towards security. As observed throughout this dissertation, a
wide swath of research in SDN-based security applications are steadily being introduced.
However, despite SDN’s ability to address numerous security vulnerabilities, develop-
ing and deploying complex SDN-based security services remains a significant challenge–
particularly for network operators who must maintain these systems and their policy con-
figurations.
Hence, we demonstrate how SDN with NFV can better empower network operators to
better defend and manage their networks in a consistently evolving attack landscape with
better tools and abstractions. Towards this end, we present the Network Flow Guard archi-
tecture as the culminating system of this work, which includes the Ryuretic programming
framework and the security policy transition framework. We also present several use cases
where SDN, working with NFV, is quickly adaptable to detect and deny security policy
violations (i.e. rogue DHCP servers, ARP poisoning, and NAT/RAP devices). Further-
more, we address a key problem for network operators involving the continual and manual
manipulation of network policy configurations.
We also believe that Ryuretic serves as powerful programming framework offering key
abstractions for rapidly prototyping and delivering innovative security and management
applications for the growing number of SDNs. Likewise, our own evaluations indicate
that Ryuretic offers similar overhead costs as other comparable programming frameworks.
However, Ryuretic does offer unique features that allow for dynamic and automated policy
enforcement transitions (i.e., the craft packet feature). Accordingly, this work serves to
push SDN and NFV towards becoming one of the most impactful technology combinations






As mentioned earlier, virtualized network functions enable much of the work completed in
this dissertation. We discuss the tools utilized below.
A.0.1 Hardware
Lenovo (W540) ThinkPad
Having 16 GB RAM, 2.40GHz Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-4700MQ CPU (8 CPUs), this com-
puter serves as the primary hardware for this work’s emulations.
TP-Link, 8-Port Gigabit Easy Smart Switch, Model TL-SG108E
This switch offers a tap port that we use to monitor network flows from various wireless
routers and wireless switches to deduce which devices decremented the time-to-live in
packet headers or exposed multiple MAC and IP addresses.
Wireless Routers and Wireless Switches
See Table 6.2.
A.0.2 Virtual Environment
Oracle VM Virtual Box
Used to run the virtual machines created for developing and testing the network security
and management solutions developed in this work.
Virtual Machines
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The virtual machines created in this work all use as their base the All-in-one SDN App
Development Starter VM, which is downloadable from www.sdnhub.org. It uses a Ubuntu
14.04 operating system, and comes preinstalled with a number or SDN controllers and
emulation environments.
Emulators
In this work, research was primary conducted in one of two virtual environments. Those
are Mininet [24] and Mininet-WiFi [25].
A.0.3 Tools
Lighttpd Web Server
Used with the Trusted Agent to render PHP/JavaScript encoded files to clients for both
client requirement validation and active testing.
DHCP Server
ISC-DHCP-server. Serves as our primary DHCP server. It is an internal Ubuntu network
service that enables host computers to be automatically assigned settings from a server as
opposed to manually configuring each network host.
UDHCPD. Serves as our rogue DHCP server. It is a very small DHCP server that
receives DHCPDISCOVER packets and responds with DHCPOFFER packets.
Scapy.py
Scapy is a powerful interactive packet manipulation program. It is able to forge or
decode packets of a wide number of protocols, send them on the wire, capture them, match
requests and replies, and much more. We use this python-based program to create many of
the servers required for our Trusted Agent as well as to generate packets for testing.
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